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I. INTRODUCTION
The disparate-impact theory of employment discrimination has re-
mained controversial since its inception.  The amended Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19641 bans race-neutral employment practices or poli-
cies, such as employment tests, that have a statistically adverse impact on
a racial group, even if there is no intent to discriminate by the employer.
Conservatives argue that employers should not be held liable for em-
ployment-test results absent intentional discrimination.  They believe that
the disparate-impact prohibition creates quotas and dual standards be-
cause employers are forced to take preemptive steps to assure employ-
ment numbers come out “right.”2  One recent example of the argument
that disparate impact creates quotas involves the controversial lawsuit in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,3  which was recently thrown out by the
Supreme Court.4  Plaintiffs “claim[ed] that Wal-Mart owes billions of dol-
lars to as many as 1.5 million women who they say were unfairly treated
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-2 (2006).
2. For a criticism of disparate impact, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 205–41(1992); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Ricci vs. DeStefano, FORBES (June 29, 2009, 2:30 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/2009/06/29/ricci-destefano-new-haven-supreme-court-affirmative-action-
opinions-columnists-firefighters.html; see generally Roger Clegg, Disparate Impact in the
Private Sector: A Theory Going Haywire, BRIEFLY . . . PERSP. ON LEGIS. REG. & LITIG.,
Dec. 2001, at 1 (discussing the “disparate-impact approach” and its problems in application
in the private sector).
3. 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
4. Adam Liptak, Justices Rule for Wal-Mart in Class-Action Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/business/21bizcourt.html?pagewanted=all.
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on pay and promotions . . . .”5  But in a brief supporting Wal-Mart, law-
yers for Costco argued that certifying the class would make employers
resort to “surreptitious quotas” as a way to avoid these suits.6
On the other hand, progressives’ view the disparate-impact statute as
an integral tool for removing unnecessary barriers for minorities seeking
gainful employment, and as an engine of social reform.7  For example,
progressives argue that women should have been able to use statistical
models to show that discrimination is widespread at Wal-Mart.  Without
disparate-impact suits, they argue, women will be unfairly held back from
management positions.
The Wal-Mart example illustrates part of the ideological struggle over
disparate impact.  Another part of this struggle that raises an equally dif-
ficult legal and public policy question is: To what extent does the dispa-
rate-impact statute and the Constitution allow or require employers to
throw out employment-test results with the intent of diversifying their
workforces?
Justice Antonin Scalia has weighed in on this debate.  In 2009, he de-
clared in Ricci v. DeStefano8 that “the war between disparate impact and
equal protection will be waged sooner or later,”9 implying that disparate
impact will inevitably be struck down as unconstitutional.  But in Lewis v.
City of Chicago,10 just one year later, he wrote in a unanimous opinion
that the Court’s “charge is to give effect to the [disparate-impact] law
Congress enacted,”11 implying that disparate impact is constitutional.
Read together, these statements seem contradictory, but this is the nature
of the struggle over disparate impact: In some situations, the application
of the disparate-impact statute seems legally permissible, but in other sit-
uations, it seems impermissible.
The Ricci case, where White firefighters challenged the constitutional-
ity of disparate impact, neatly illustrates this battle over disparate impact,
because the case incited ideological conflict and racial politics.12  In Ricci,
5. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh Sociology Issue in Wal-Mart Discrimination
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at A17, available at 2011 WLNR 5971963.
6. Brief for Costco Wholesale Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277).
7. See generally Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening
Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73 (2010) (arguing against making
racially attentive efforts, like complying with disparate impact, the equivalent of reverse
discrimination).
8. 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
9. Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
10. 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
11. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2010).
12. See Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341,
1367 (2010) (illustrating a change in policy).
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the City of New Haven, after a heated debate, threw out the examina-
tions of over a hundred firefighters who took a promotional test, when it
was discovered that too few minorities would have been promoted.13
New Haven authorities thought that they would be liable in a disparate-
impact suit if the test were certified for use to determine promotions.14
Because the city discarded the promotional test, a group of White
firefighters (and one Hispanic), who likely would have been promoted
based on their good test performance, sued the city.15  One claim alleged
intentional discrimination under Title VII, and the other claim alleged
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.16
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held in Ricci—now one of the
most important race discrimination cases in the Court’s history17—that
the city intentionally discriminated against the White firefighters by
throwing out the test.18  The Court found that the city, in voluntarily try-
ing to prevent a disparate-impact suit from minorities by discarding the
test, violated Title VII’s prohibition on intentional discrimination, or dis-
parate treatment.19  According to the Court, the city’s primary reason for
discarding the test was that the main beneficiaries of the test were
White.20  The Court then adopted a new rule to reduce the tension be-
tween Title VII’s disparate-impact and disparate-treatment provisions:
“[R]ace-based action like the city’s in this case is impermissible under
Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong-basis in evidence
that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the
disparate-impact statute.”21  The Court held that the city did not have a
strong basis in evidence that they would be held liable in a disparate-
impact suit.22
Because there was a statutory fix under Title VII, the Court dismissed
the equal protection issue.23  The equal protection issue, simply put, is
whether the disparate-impact statute is so race-conscious that Congress
was prohibited from enacting it in the first place. The Court did not con-




17. Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 581, 582 (2010).
18. Ricci, 564 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
19. Id.
20. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
21. Id.
22. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
23. Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664–65 (2009).
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sider whether the new strong-basis standard would pass muster under
equal protection scrutiny.24
However, Justice Scalia, in concurrence, strongly hinted that disparate
impact is unconstitutional.25  Scalia argued that the strong-basis standard
Ricci created postpones the day when the Court will have to confront the
hard question of whether disparate impact is consistent with the Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of equal protection.26  In other words, under what cir-
cumstances can employers intentionally discriminate in order to avoid
unintended discrimination that results from facially-neutral policies?
Professor Richard Primus argues that the equal protection issue is legally
complex and symbolically sensitive since Title VII’s disparate impact “re-
quires employers and public officials to classify the workforce into racial
categories and then allocate social goods on the basis of that
classification.”27
Quite possibly, the newly created strong-basis standard, even if applied
as though there was a legitimate fear of disparate impact, would not sat-
isfy the Constitution’s ban on intentional discrimination. In one provoca-
tive article, Linda Greenhouse argues that “race remains an unfinished
project of the Roberts court,” and that the question over the consti-
tutionality of disparate impact has “hung heavy, and [remained]
unanswered.”28
In the other recent disparate-impact decision, Lewis v. City of Chicago,
the Court resolved a technical issue over the scope of disparate impact’s
statute of limitations.  The Court unanimously held that when an em-
ployer institutes an employment practice, like a test, that has a disparate
impact on a group, employees may challenge the practice each time the
employer uses it.29  This holding effectively increases the scope of dispa-
rate-impact’s statute of limitations in certain situations because employ-
ees can now sue using the disparate-impact theory years after a
discriminatory test is first used.  Previously, an employer could lock in a
discriminatory employment practice in perpetuity if an employee did not
sue right away, since the statute of limitations would have passed.
After Lewis and Ricci, employers are left with a puzzling legal frame-
work for dealing with employment tests that adversely affect a group.
Employers have one option of using exam results that have an adverse
impact, and risk lawsuits from the adversely affected group (possibly
24. Id.
25. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
26. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2681–82 (Scalia, J., concurring).
27. Primus, supra note 12, at 1342.
28. Linda Greenhouse, Is Anyone Watching?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, opinion-
ator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/is-anyone-watching/.
29. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2010).
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years after the test was created).30  Or, employers can disregard those
results that adversely affected one group, and risk lawsuits from those
who stood to benefit from the test.31  Although this legal framework can
be puzzling, it still furthers the important policy goal of disparate impact
by removing artificial barriers to employment for all job applicants.
This Note offers a solution to these disparate-impact conundrums.
First, I propose that courts avoid the potential constitutional showdown
over disparate impact. Second, I argue that the strong-basis standard
should be kept because this standard is the best policy and legal standard
for dealing with Ricci-like situations, which exhibit considerable tension
between the disparate-impact and disparate-treatment prongs of Title
VII.
This Note fills a void in disparate-impact scholarship by offering an
overlooked way courts should analyze the constitutional debate over dis-
parate impact: the constitutional avoidance reading.  The canon of consti-
tutional avoidance holds that between two plausible readings of a
statute—one that raises serious constitutional problems and another that
does not—a court should construe the statute in a way that avoids the
constitutional issue as long as that reading is not contrary to the intent of
Congress.  Congress expressly codified the disparate-impact statute to
run in tandem with disparate treatment.  And one way to ensure that the
two provisions run in tandem was for the Ricci Court to construe Title
VII to include a strong-basis standard as a way to avoid the constitutional
issue.32
The constitutional avoidance reading urges courts to keep avoiding the
equal protection issue by using the strong-basis standard to mediate the
conflict between disparate impact and disparate treatment.  The strong-
basis standard also helps ameliorate the tension between equal protection
norms and public-employer discrimination, especially when public em-
ployers throw out tests if too few minorities pass.  Under Ricci, if the city
actually had a strong basis to believe that they would be liable for dispa-
rate impact and they discarded the test for legitimate reasons, the city
would not have violated the Constitution for intentionally discriminating
30. Cynthia Dizikes & David Savage, Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Blacks for
Chicago Firefighter Jobs, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 2010, at A6, available at 2010 WLNR
10744991.
31. Id.
32. Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009).  The proposed stan-
dard that the Ricci Court rejected—a good-cause standard—would too easily allow an em-
ployer to throw out facially race-neutral tests like the test in Ricci.  Under this lighter
evidentiary standard, an employer could racially balance their workforce by throwing tests
out in “good faith” until the numbers came out right, which may violate equal protection
norms.
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against the White firefighters.  This narrower form of disparate impact
that Ricci creates should survive because it does not raise serious consti-
tutional issues.
Although Ricci implicitly avoided the constitutional issue, I argue that
courts should explicitly avoid the constitutional issue in future cases if a
litigant makes a wholesale challenge to disparate impact.  Those arguing
for avoidance should try to persuade courts to further interpret the dispa-
rate-impact statute in a way that allows the strong-basis standard to alle-
viate equal protection concerns.
This Note proceeds in three parts.  Part II surveys Ricci and Lewis, and
analyzes the ongoing struggle over disparate impact.  Part III examines
the confrontation between the Equal Protection Clause and disparate im-
pact, and offers the constitutional avoidance reading as a solution to this
conflict.  An important wrinkle examined here is that if a court wants to
strike down disparate impact, they would have to confront the equally
contested issue of whether Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
authorizes Congress to create the disparate-impact statute as a means of
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause.  Part IV defends the strong-basis
standard by assessing the policy arguments for using this standard and the
arguments against using the standard.  This Note concludes that the
strong-basis standard is the best standard available.
II. EXPLAINING THE CONFUSION IN RICCI AND LEWIS
A. Legal Background
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against
any individual . . . because of such individual’s race.”  Title VII prohibits
two types of discrimination: (1) disparate-treatment discrimination, which
is intentional discrimination, and (2) disparate-impact discrimination,
which is unintentional.33  The Supreme Court explained that “‘[d]isparate
treatment’ is . . . the most easily understood type of discrimination.  The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race . . . . ”34  On the other hand, a disparate-impact violation hap-
33. Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and
the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (2009); see
also Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 701,
705 (explaining that intent need not be shown in a claim involving disparate impact).
34. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); see also Ky.
Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, 140 (2008) (defining disparate treatment as intentional
discrimination); HENRY H. PERRITT JR., CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 337 (3d ed.
2001) (providing an introductory overview of the mixed-motive analysis).  Disparate treat-
ment bans two different categories of discrimination.  Disparate treatment bans “employ-
ers [from] applying different rules to employees of different races”; namely, “people are
treated disparately, and therein lies the illegality.”  Primus, supra note 12, at 1350; see also
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pens when facially race-neutral employment policies, like tests, have an
adverse impact on a particular race even if the employer did not intend to
create the adverse result.35
The Court created the disparate-impact doctrine in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.36 by interpreting Title VII to proscribe “not only overt dis-
crimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation.”37  Disparate impact targets employment practices that have
no business necessity, which means that “[i]f an employment practice
which operates to exclude [minorities] cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited.”38  The disparate-impact the-
ory has been criticized significantly more than disparate treatment, and it
suffered a near-death experience in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,39
which significantly weakened the doctrine.40  But after a firestorm of pro-
test, Congress codified the disparate-impact theory into Title VII when
they enacted The Civil Rights Act of 1991.41  Currently, the disparate-
impact statute has been used almost exclusively to challenge the employ-
ment tests42 of public employers.43  Disparate impact lawsuits are ex-
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (finding that a court must deter-
mine whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than others because of
protected characteristics).  The second strand of disparate treatment covers “illicit em-
ployer motive, whether or not those motives lead to disparities in the individuals of differ-
ent races.”  Primus, supra, at 1350. In all cases, the plaintiff must show that the employer
acted with discriminatory intent, which is often accomplished by using comparators—other
employees who are similar to the plaintiff in all respects except for the protected character-
istic.  Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 731 n.3
(2011); see also Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 206 (2009) (finding that a similarly situated comparator
is not required but that “the absence of a comparator is often fatal to a claim”).
35. See Ricci, 564 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
36. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
37. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
38. Id.
39. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
40. Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another Turn on
the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 412 (2010).
41. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 et seq.); Sullivan, supra note 40.
42. Selmi, supra note 33 (finding that written tests are “the only category of claim for
which legal standards have evolved to evaluate the permissibility of employment
practices”).
43. The reason public employment tests are challenged so often is that “in thirty-four
states, state and local government employers are required . . . to use competitive examina-
tions to select applicants for [future] employment opportunities.”  Brief for Pac. Legal
Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 21, Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S.
__, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010) (No. 08-974).
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tremely difficult to win, but the ones that are meritorious do help open
doors for minorities.44
There are three components to make out a case under the disparate-
impact statute.  First, a plaintiff must establish prima-facie violation of the
statute by showing that an employer uses a particular employment prac-
tice, like a test, that causes a disparate impact on a race.45  Second, an
employer may defend against the suit by demonstrating that their em-
ployment practice is job related for the position in question and consis-
tent with business necessity.46  Third, even if the employer meets that
burden, a plaintiff can still succeed by proving that the employer refused
to adopt an alternative test that has less disparate impact and serves the
employer’s legitimate needs.47
One major procedural hurdle for plaintiffs under Title VII is that the
plaintiff must file a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).48  Plaintiffs must file their
charges with the EEOC three hundred days after the allegedly discrimi-
natory act occurs or the claims are time-barred by the statute of
limitations.49
B. Lewis v. City of Chicago: Expanding the Disparate-Impact Statute
of Limitations
In 1995, the City of Chicago administered a pen-and-pencil examina-
tion to over 26,000 applicants seeking to become firefighters.50  Once the
exams were scored, the city announced that the applicants were sorted
into three categories based on their scores: well qualified, qualified, and
not qualified.51  The city then created an official hiring list that reflected
44. Selmi, supra note 33, at 706 (“[T]he reality has been that disparate impact claims
are more difficult—not easier—to prove than claims of intentional discrimination.”).
Selmi’s empirical research on disparate impact reveals that few disparate impact claims are
brought in the first place, and out of those, only a handful ever win.  Id. at 738–40; e.g.
United States v. City of New York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (deciding what
would quickly become a prominent, meritorious disparate-impact suit).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
46. Id.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C).
48. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2196–97 (2010). See gener-
ally Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 499, 503-07 (2010) (explaining Title VII’s complex procedural scheme).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006).
50. Lewis, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2195.
51. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2195–96.  Well-qualified applicants scored the highest on the
exam, and the city would randomly draw from this group to fill the open positions. Id. at
__, 130 S. Ct. at 2195.  Applicants that scored in the unqualified range did not pass the test
and would not be chosen. Id.  Those that scored between the well-qualified and not quali-
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the breakdown of results.52  Then the city exclusively hired the well-quali-
fied applicants off this list for years.53
A class of African-Americans who scored in the qualified range on the
examination, and had not been hired, sued claiming that the tests had an
impermissible disparate impact.54  The first Black applicant filed an
EEOC charge less than three-hundred days after Chicago first hired well-
qualified firefighters off the list, but this was more than three-hundred
days after the city created the hiring list that categorized the firefighters.
The question presented was: When an employer adopts an employment
practice that discriminates in violation of the disparate-impact provision,
must the plaintiff file a claim within three-hundred days after the an-
nouncement of the practice (announcing the hiring list), or within three-
hundred days after the employer executes the practice (the employer
hires off the discriminatory list)?55
The Supreme Court held that Title VII dictates the latter.56  The
firefighters can file their Title VII disparate-impact claim within three-
hundred days after the employer uses any unlawful practice (like using
the results of a discriminatory test to make the hiring decision) that
causes a disparate impact, as long as the plaintiff can claim that each ele-
ment of a disparate impact claim is met.57
The Court was not persuaded by the city’s policy concerns that employ-
ers will likely face new disparate-impact suits for practices they have used
fied cut-off scores were deemed qualified. Id.  Qualified applicants had passed, but they
were told that it was unlikely they would be hired. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2195–96.  How-
ever, the city told qualified applicants that because it is not possible to predict how many
applicants will be hired in the next few years their names will be kept on the hiring list for
as long as that list is used. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2196.
52. Lewis, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2196.
53. Id.
54. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Lewis v.
City of Chicago, 560 U.S. __,  130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010) (No. 08-974).  It was clear that the test
had a statistical adverse impact for African-Americans, which constitutes a prima facie
case under the disparate-impact statute. Lewis, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2198.
55. Lewis, 560 U.S at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2195–96.
56. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2197.
57. Lewis, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2197.  The Court reasoned that the principle
inquiry was actually whether hiring only from the discriminatory list, although created
years before, was itself a Title VII violation. Id.  The Court held that hiring off the list was
an “employment practice” under the disparate-impact statute, and that the city uses that
employment practice every time the list is relied upon for hiring. Id.  A disparate-impact
violation occurs whenever a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a par-
ticular employment practice that causes a disparate impact. Id.  And the city used a dis-
criminatory employment policy both when the city created the list and each time it hired
from the list. Id.
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regularly for years.58  The Court reasoned that either way the statute is
read it produces puzzling results.59  The city’s reading would allow an em-
ployer to use a discriminatory employment practice indefinitely if no
timely charge was brought, inducing plaintiffs to sue before they have any
basis for believing that they will not be hired.60  Justice Scalia concluded
that the Court has to give effect to the statute Congress enacted, even if
employees are now allowed to sue years after the test was created.61
Lewis is important because it shows that the Roberts Court is serious
about reading Congress’s intent towards Title VII neutrally, and that the
Court is not committed to weakening the disparate-impact theory.62
C. Ricci v. DeStefano: Creating the Strong-Basis Standard
In Ricci, the City of New Haven instituted an employment test to fill
the leadership positions in the fire department.63  Once the results came
back, it was evident that African-Americans and Hispanics scored
poorly.64  If the test was used to determine promotions, Whites would
acquire nearly all of the promotions, and no African-Americans and only
two Hispanics would have scored high enough to be promoted.65  Since
so few minorities would be promoted, the city was concerned that using
the test would subject the city to disparate-impact liability claims from
African-Americans.66  Ultimately, the city discarded the test.67
58. By allowing plaintiffs to sue years after a practice was first set in place, the ruling
expanded disparate impact.  Michael Newman & Faith Isenhath, Lewis v. City of Chicago:
The Expansion of Disparate Impact Claims, FED. LAW., Oct. 2010, at 13.
59. Lewis, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2200.
60. Newman & Isenhath, supra note 58.
61. Lewis, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2200.
62. See John B. Lough Jr., Test Results: Despite the Ruling in Lewis, Employees Still
Face an Uphill Battle in Discrimination Cases, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2011, at 35 (“While Lewis
does not signal a proemployee trend by the Court under Chief Justice John Roberts, work-
ers can take some small solace that the Roberts Court is probably not antiworker.”); Carl
Cecere, The Court Challenges Expectations in Review of Firefighter Testing, SCOTUSblog
(May 27th, 2010, 3:55 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2010/05/the-court-challenges-expecta-
tions-in-review-of-firefighter-testing/.
63. Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (2009).   Once the test was
completed, the city was supposed to certify a ranked list of applicants who passed the test,
and the city was required to fill each new vacancy by choosing one candidate from the top
three scorers on the list. Id. The city hired a company that specializes in designing promo-
tional examinations for fire departments to create the test. Id. The test was designed with
painstaking analysis to ensure that it was race neutral; at every stage of the job analysis, the
testing company deliberately oversampled minority firefighters to ensure that the results
would not favor White candidates. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2666.
64. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
65. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2666.
66. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2667.
67. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
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The Ricci plaintiffs sued the city for throwing out the test, contending
that the city discriminated against White firefighters under the disparate-
treatment prohibition.68  The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts69
and awarded summary judgment to the firefighters on their Title VII dis-
parate-treatment claim but dismissed the equal protection claim.70
The Court found that if they resolved the case on Title VII grounds,
they could avoid the fundamental constitutional question of whether the
disparate-impact prohibition violates the Constitution.  Justice Kennedy
began with the premise that discarding the tests by the city violates Title
VII’s disparate-treatment prohibition, unless there is some valid de-
fense.71  Unlike the district court, which called the city’s action “race neu-
tral” since all of the tests were discarded, the Court held that discarding
the test was express, race-based decision-making that violated Title VII’s
disparate-treatment command since the city thought too many Whites
and not enough minorities would be promoted.72  Put in a slightly differ-
ent way, the city generally could not tell the passing firefighters that they
would not be promoted simply because others failed.73
However, Kennedy’s opinion stated that the city’s employment action,
taken with the intent to avoid disparate impact, could sometimes be a
defense to a disparate-treatment suit.74  The problem was delineating
when the threat of disparate-impact liability could be a defense, and how
much evidence is necessary for that defense to be valid.  The Court re-
jected the plaintiff’s proposed solution.75  It also rejected the city’s pro-
posed standard that an employer’s mere good-faith belief that its actions
68. Ricci, 564 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
69. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
70. Id.; see Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 La-
bor and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 256–57 (2009) (finding that
it was unusual for the Ricci Court to not remand the case to the district court for reconsid-
eration under the strong-basis standard).
71. Ricci, 564 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
72. Id.
73. Donald J. Kochan, On Equality: The Anti-Interference Principle, 45 U. RICH. L.
REV. 431, 457 (2011).
74. Ricci, 564 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2673 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). But see
id. at  __, 129 S. Ct. at 2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding no “intra-statutory discord”
between disparate impact and disparate treatment). Indeed, Ricci is the first case to ever
identify tension between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination. Id.
75. The plaintiffs argued that avoiding an unintentional disparate impact is never a
defense to intentional, disparate-treatment discrimination. Ricci, 564 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct.
at 2674.  But Kennedy rejected this argument because Congress expressly codified the dis-
parate-impact provision to run in tandem with disparate treatment, and the Court has to
“give effect to both provisions where possible.” Id.  Kennedy also rejected the firefighters’
suggestion that an employer must be in violation of the disparate-impact provision before
the employer can use the need to comply with disparate impact as a defense to disparate
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are necessary to comply with disparate impact should be enough to justify
race-conscious conduct.76  Allowing employers to intentionally discrimi-
nate when there is only a good-faith belief of potential disparate-impact
liability would encourage race-based action at the slightest hint of dispa-
rate impact.  The Court was concerned that this good-cause standard
would create a de facto quota system, and an employer could discard test
results with the intent of obtaining the employer’s preferred racial
balance.77
In deciding on a standard, the Ricci Court borrowed from equal protec-
tion jurisprudence to relieve the newfound tension between the dispa-
rate-treatment and disparate-impact prongs of Title VII.  Under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court has held that government can take
race-based action—such as creating affirmative action programs to bene-
fit minorities—to remedy past racial discrimination if there is a strong
basis in evidence that the remedial actions are necessary.78  In the equal
protection context, there is a tension between eliminating the effects of
past discrimination and abolishing all governmental race discrimination.
This is similar to the tension between disparate treatment and disparate
impact; disparate treatment seeks to bar all race-conscious action
whereas disparate impact encourages race-conscious action to remedy ra-
cial imbalances in the workplace.  The Court then borrowed the equal
protection strong-basis standard to create a new Title VII strong-basis
standard:
[U]nder Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional dis-
crimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an
unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong ba-
sis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liabil-
ity if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.79
treatment, since voluntary compliance is the preferred means of enforcing Title VII, this
proposed standard would halt compliance efforts. Id.
76. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2674–75.
77. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2675.
78. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2675.  In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) the Court applied the strong-basis standard to an affirmative action program and
struck it down because “an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimina-
tion . . . cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.” Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.  The
Croson Court found that governments “may take remedial action when they possess evi-
dence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimina-
tion,” and the strong-basis standard requires that “they must identify that discrimination,
public or private, with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.” Id. at
504.
79. Ricci, 564 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2677; see also New Supreme Court Ruling Rocks
Your Title VII World, MICH. EMP. L. LETTER, Aug. 2009, at 1 (stating that Ricci created
the new strong-basis standard).
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Applying the strong-basis standard to Title VII gives effect to both the
disparate-treatment and the disparate-impact provisions.80  An employer
can only take a race-based action that violates disparate treatment if the
employer has a strong basis in evidence that it would be liable under the
disparate-impact statute.  In Ricci, this means that the city would have
had to collect enough evidence before throwing out the test to show that
it had a strong basis for believing that it would face disparate-impact lia-
bility.  However, the employer does not have to prove an actual violation
of disparate impact against itself to discard the tests.  This gives the em-
ployer some discretion to throw out tests that have adverse impacts.
After creating the strong-basis standard, the Court found that the city
did not have a strong basis to believe they would be liable for disparate
impact, and thus could not discard the test.81  Kennedy acknowledged
that there was a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability, since the
pass rate for minority candidates was about half the pass rate for White
candidates.82  Yet, even though there was a prima-facie case, the city still
needed some evidence that the exams were not job related, or that there
existed a less-discriminatory alternative, to pass the strong-basis stan-
dard.83  The Court found that the test was job related, and there was no
less discriminatory test available.84  Justice Kennedy’s opinion also cre-
ated a confusing defense to a potential disparate-impact suit in case the
Black firefighters sued.85
In the final chapter of this case, the White firefighters settled their
claims of bias for about $2 million in July 2011.86 The settlement ended a
seven-year-long legal battle that sparked national debate over the racial
justice of disparate impact.87
80. Ricci, 564 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2676.




85. If the city uses the tests and the city faces a disparate-impact suit, then the city
could “avoid disparate impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not
certified the results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment liability.” Ricci, 564
U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.  So the likelihood of disparate-treatment liability for an
employer is a possible defense to a disparate-impact suit. LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 23.07 (2010). See generally Joseph A. Seiner &
Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald A New Disparate Impact?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2181,
2181, 2222 (2010) (explaining this possible new defense to a disparate-impact suit, but find-
ing that all interpretations of this defense have weaknesses and that ultimately courts will
have to decide how this defense can be used).
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D. Why Lewis and Ricci Created a Catch-22 in Employment Testing
These cases show reasonable people can disagree about the scope of
the disparate-impact statute.  Under this Ricci-Lewis framework, employ-
ees not hired are going to want to take advantage of the extension of the
statute of limitations under Lewis to sue whenever there is a statistical
disparity from an employment practice, even if it was years after it was
first instituted.  However, employers are incentivized under Ricci to con-
tinue to use test results or practices that they know are discriminatory,
like the City of Chicago did in Lewis, because they do not want to be held
liable by those who benefited.  This framework creates a “damned if you
do, damned if you don’t situation”88 for employment testing.  If the em-
ployer throws the test out, they will face a disparate-treatment suit by
those that stood to benefit.  If they keep the test, those that did not do
well will sue.  This is a Catch-2289 because it seems no matter what the
outcome of a test (apart from a perfectly proportional racial and gender
pass rate) there is likely to be a lawsuit.  Indeed, most employment tests
have a disparate impact on at least one protected group.90
The Ricci-Lewis framework will affect public employers more ad-
versely than private employers.  Private employers “have learned to live
with the employment discrimination laws” by employing “large
staffs . . . to implement and monitor procedures” to deal with “employ-
ment discrimination and affirmative action.”91  But public employers are
less sophisticated and have not adapted so easily, which is a concern given
the tremendous impact of public jobs on the safety of the community.92
88. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658
(2009) (Nos. 07-1428 & 08-328) (statement of Justice David Souter).
89. Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1552 (2009) (defining
Catch-22 as a “no-win situation built on illogic and circular reasoning”).
90. Gail Heriot, Disparate Impact and the Soft Coercion of the Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Procedures, SCOTUSblog, Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/02/
disparate-impact-and-the-soft-coercion-of-the-uniform-guidelines-on-employee-proce-
dures/ (“[N]early all qualifications have a substantial disparate impact. . . .  Indeed, it
would be difficult to find a single, significant job qualification that does not have a substan-
tial disparate impact on some protected group.”).  One expert industrial/organizational
psychologist testified in the Ricci litigation that “[n]ormally, [W]hites outperform ethnic
minorities on the majority of standardized testing procedures.” Ricci, 564 U.S. at __, 129 S.
Ct. at 2668 (first alteration in the original).
91. PATRICIA A. BRANDIN & DAVID A. COPUS, IN DEFENSE OF THE PUBLIC EM-
PLOYER xxiii–xxiv (1988) (“[C]urrently the volume of public sector employment discrimi-
nation litigation is increasing . . . under Title VII . . . .”).
92. Id. at xxviii.
Police and fire employees . . . have an immediate impact on the safety of members of
the public. . . . For this reason, decisions as to whether to hire and retain employees in
these job categories cannot be made with sole reference to the desires of the employ-
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This creates a dilemma for public employers.93  If public employers settle
employment lawsuits, they will likely get rid of their employment-dis-
crimination claims.  But if they hire unqualified employees, they will be
liable to the public if these employees do not perform.94
One question lurking in this debate is whether creating better tests will
stop adverse impacts.  Unfortunately, the short answer is that better tests
have not been proven to reduce adverse impacts.  Some scholars claim
that there are better testing alternatives that municipalities could use that
would have less of an adverse impact such as assessment-center testing.95
However, there is little empirical evidence that assessment centers reduce
the disparate impact of tests.96
One way to reduce tests that have an adverse impact is to throw them
out and start over, but this runs squarely into the problem of complying
with the strong-basis standard.  Some commentators argue that “litigators
can meet [the strong-basis standard] burden through statistical techniques
that are specifically geared toward gauging how a test or performance
assessment may be biased in favor of one group or against another.”97
ing unit or the employees themselves, but need to made with a view towards any




95. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 7, at 155 nn.290–91.  An assessment center
is a skills-based test in which candidates are judged on how well they do on simulated
exercises  There is a whole literature on how test consultants can avoid disparate impacts.
See, e.g., DAN BIDDLE, ADVERSE IMPACT AND TEST VALIDATION: A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE TO VALID AND DEFENSIBLE EMPLOYMENT TESTING xxi–xxv (2d. ed. 2006)
(describing different adverse impact analyses programs and how they can be used to evalu-
ate employment testing); Nancy T. Tippins, Adverse Impact in Employee Selection Proce-
dures From the Perspective of an Organizational Consultant, in ADVERSE IMPACT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL STAFFING AND HIGH STAKES SELECTION (James L.
Outtz ed., 2010) (discussing various ways to calculate adverse impact in testing programs
and strategies to minimize its effects once discovered).  In Ricci, assessment-center testing
was brought up during a hearing as a better alternative to the oral and written tests that
were used. Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2669 (2009).
96. Greg Mitchell, Response, Good Scholarly Intentions Do Not Guarantee Good Pol-
icy, 95 VA. L. REV. 109, 111 (2010), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/
2010/02/28/mitchell.pdf.  For example, in a recent analysis of the research examining racial
differences in assessment-center evaluations, scholars found “that Black-White mean dif-
ferences for assessment centers are not as small as has been suggested by a number of
researchers.”  Michelle A. Dean et al., Ethnic and Gender Subgroup Differences in Assess-
ment Center Ratings: A Meta-Analysis, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 685, 690 (2008).  More
research is necessary to draw any conclusions as to the benefit of assessment centers for
reducing disparate impacts. Id.
97. Jason M. Szanyi & Katarina Guttmannova, Presenting a “Strong Basis in Evi-
dence”: How Lawyers Should Use Statistics to Shape the Impact of Ricci v. DeStefano on
Title VII Litigation, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Online) (Feb. 4, 2010), http://
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Whether sophisticated statistical analysis will actually ease the burden of
proving there is a strong-basis for throwing out a test is a difficult ques-
tion because the Ricci Court chose a burdensome standard.
The point here is that there are no quick answers for solving the em-
ployment-testing Catch-22 since most employment tests have a disparate
impact.  Nevertheless, disparate impact still has a redeeming public policy
rationale because the theory continues to play a vital role in encouraging
employers to create fair employment tests.
III. RESOLVING THE EMPLOYMENT TESTING CONUNDRUM
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEVEL
Instead of addressing the equal protection issue in Ricci, the Court bor-
rowed the strong-basis standard from equal protection to provide a statu-
tory fix.  The question remains: Does meeting the strong-basis standard
ever justify discriminatory treatment under the Constitution?  In the
1970s, scholars began questioning whether the disparate-impact theory in
Title VII is constitutional, and now the debate is in its third round.  The
first round was the question presented in Washington v. Davis:98 Does the
Equal Protection Clause protect against government employment tests
that cause an adverse impact?  The Davis Court said “no,” and held that
there is no constitutional violation for a disproportionate impact on a ra-
cial group from race-neutral practices.99  The Constitution only forbids
intentional discrimination.  “In the second round, the issue was whether
federal statutes prohibiting facially neutral practices with racially dispa-
rate impacts were valid only as commerce legislation or also as means of
enforcing equal protection under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”100  This second round of debate has not been formally resolved,
but still has bearing on the current debate.  Finally, the third round was
prompted by Professor Primus, who first asked whether the Equal Pro-
tection Clause prohibits Congress from enacting Title VII’s disparate-im-
www.hlpronline.com/2010/02/szanyi-guttmannova; see generally Joseph L. Gastwirth &
Weiwen Miao, Formal Statistical Analysis of the Data in Disparate Impact Cases Provides
Sounder Inferences Than the U.S. Government’s ‘Four-Fifths’ Rule: An Examination of the
Statistical Evidence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 8 L. PROB. & RISK 171 (2009) (arguing that more
careful statistical analysis in disparate impact cases would provide a better measure of the
extent of adverse impact).
98. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
99. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976).
100. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 495 (2003); see infra Part III.A.iv.
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pact provision in the first place “because of [disparate impact’s] overt
concern with race.”101
The reason there is a conflict between equal protection and disparate
impact is because the “constitutional antidiscrimination doctrine—that is,
the law of equal protection—has . . . the same substantive content as Title
VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment.”102  Despite some differences,
the doctrines are virtually the same.103  In short, the Court defined equal
protection and disparate treatment as both being opposed to disparate
impact because disparate-impact discrimination is less morally objection-
able than intentional discrimination.104  This is why disparate treatment
became the core concern of Title VII and the only antidiscrimination con-
cern of the Constitution.105
The current tension between equal protection and disparate impact can
be framed as a question of whether the strong-basis standard provides
enough protection against intentional discrimination by state employ-
ers.106  It might be the case that if a state actor has a strong basis to be-
101. Primus, supra note 100, at 495–96 (“Pre-Davis, many courts and commentators
believed that state actions creating disparate impacts violated equal protection; post-
Adarand, one could well ask whether state actions prohibiting disparate impact violate
equal protection.”) (emphasis in original). Ricci deliberately avoided this question.
102. Primus, supra note 12, at 1354, 1356; GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 32 (2d ed. 2007)
(finding that “the statutory law of employment discrimination follows constitutional law in
leaving the exact nature of what is prohibited without any precise definition”).
103. Primus, supra note 12, at 1354.  The principle difference is that “[e]qual protec-
tion doctrine covers all government actors, whether or not they are employers, but it
reaches no private parties,” whereas “Title VII reaches only employers, but it covers all
employers, private or public, over a certain size.” Id. at 1354 n.69 (2010).
104. See Primus, supra note 12, at 1355–56 (emphasizing the conflicts between the
doctrines of equal protection and disparate treatment and that of disparate impact doc-
trine). In other words, the disparate-impact statute reaches far “beyond punishing behavior
that most Americans regard as morally unacceptable.” Richard Primus, The Individual,
Above All, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2011, 12:21 PM), www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/
06/20/a-death-blow-to-class-action/the-individual-above-all.
105. See Primus, supra note 12, at, 1354–55 (acknowledging largely procedural differ-
ences between equal-protection and disparate-treatment doctrines but stating that “the
conceptual content of the two frameworks is the same”); see also Selmi, supra note 33, at
706 (“[C]ourts never fully accepted the disparate impact theory as a legitimate definition of
discrimination, or as a legitimate means of proving discrimination, and it was a mistake to
think that they would.”).
106. Under the state action doctrine, only public employers can violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, not private employers. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian,
488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (“Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a
dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny . . . and private conduct,
against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may
be.”); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“[The legislative power] does not
authorize congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights;
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lieve that it would be liable for a disparate impact and discards the test,
the Title VII carve-out (the strong-basis standard) may not be a constitu-
tional defense to a claim of intentional discrimination for unlawfully dis-
carding a test.
The following first explains Scalia’s argument that disparate impact is
unconstitutional and then moves on to the primary argument: Courts
should avoid the difficult question of whether disparate impact is consti-
tutional because the strong-basis standard provides enough protection
against unlawful discrimination by public actors.  A second argument is
then made that the Supreme Court’s failure to raise this question of dis-
parate impact’s constitutionality on their own accord is another reason
why litigants and courts should avoid the question.  Finally, I argue that
another reason for avoidance is that in addressing the constitutionality of
disparate impact, the Supreme Court would have to resolve the equally
difficult question of the extent to which Congress can enact civil rights
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Scalia’s Ricci Concurrence: Provoking the War between Disparate
Impact and Equal Protection
Scalia’s concurrence represents the first judicial inquiry as to whether
disparate impact is unconstitutional.  His difficulty with Title VII’s dispa-
rate-impact provision stems from the fact that it requires race-based ac-
tion if an employer’s practice has a disproportionate effect on a particular
race.107  In Ricci, this means that if there were a strong basis for the city
to believe they would be liable under disparate impact, then the city
could take a race-based action (throwing out the test) without facing lia-
bility from the White firefighters.  But if there were an actual violation of
disparate impact—a prima facie case plus no job-relatedness or a less-
discriminatory alternative test—then the employer is required to remedy
the racial imbalance or face liability if sued.108
Because the federal government cannot discriminate based on race,
Congress cannot enact laws like disparate impact that forces employers
(private, state, or municipal) to discriminate based on race.109  Scalia ex-
plains that:
but to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and the action of state
officers . . . .”).
107. Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
108. Id.  Scalia puts “remedial” in quote marks in the opinion because he questions
whether the city was fulfilling any remedial action when the city discarded the test.
109. Id.  Under the state-action requirement, only public employers can violate the
Equal Protection Clause, not private employers. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
But if Congress creates a statute that would be prohibited by the states under the Equal
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Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the
scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of
their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those
racial outcomes.  That type of racial decision-making is . . .
discriminatory.110
Although disparate impact is not a racial classification or quota on its
face, disparate impact still can cause pernicious race-conscious action, ac-
cording to Scalia.111
However, an employer could devise a facially neutral hiring standard
that intentionally discriminated against one race:
Would a private employer not be guilty of unlawful discrimination if
he refrained from establishing a racial hiring quota but intentionally
designed his hiring practices to achieve the same end?  Surely, he
would.  Intentional discrimination is still occurring, just one step up
the chain.  Government compulsion of such design would therefore
seemingly violate equal protection principles.112
To Scalia, this threat of disparate-impact liability violates the colorblind
view of the Constitution and gives employers an excuse to intentionally
discriminate.113
Protection Clause, this is still a constitutional violation under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (stating that “[e]qual protec-
tion analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
110. Ricci, 564 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. Id.; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“[O]utright racial balanc-
ing . . . is patently unconstitutional.”).
112. Ricci, 564 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. Id. (alluding to the necessity for the government to “‘treat citizens as individuals,
not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class’” (quoting Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995))); see also Destiny Peery, Comment, The Colorblind
Ideal in a Race-Conscious Reality: The Case for a New Legal Ideal for Race Relations, 6
NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 473, 479 (2011) (characterizing Ricci  as a return to the colorblind
ideal).  A majority of the Court has never adopted the full colorblindness principle that
Scalia has advocated for, where race-conscious criteria can never be a factor in government
decision-making. See Ellen D. Katz, Engineering the Endgame, 109 MICH. L. REV. 349,
365–66 (2010) (explaining that repudiation of particular remedial methods results from
determining that those “methods impose serious costs that presently outweigh any benefit
the remedies produce”); see also Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Pur-
pose?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 837, 841–42 (2011) (theorizing that the Ricci and Parents Involved
opinions show an increased willingness by the Court to at least “entertain[ ] the equiva-
lence doctrine”).  However, a plurality of the court has adopted this principle of race neu-
trality. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007) (plurality opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”).  One scholar considers decisions like these to be
“reactionary colorblindness,” or “an anticlassification understanding of the Equal Protec-
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B. The Constitutional Avoidance Reading Allows Disparate Impact to
Survive
Because both equal protection and disparate treatment ban intentional
discrimination, the tensions between disparate treatment and disparate
impact create a parallel tension between equal protection and disparate
impact.  Whether this tension is enough to strike disparate impact is one
of the most important questions in antidiscrimination law today.
This Note offers a new way courts and litigants should approach this
constitutional issue: the constitutional-avoidance reading.114  This avoid-
tion Clause that accords race-conscious remedies and racial subjugation the same level of
constitutional hostility.” Ian F. Haney Lo´pez, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity,
and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 988 (2007); see also Reva B. Siegel,
Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and
Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 82 (2000) (commenting on Robert
Post’s lecture, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law,
and writing that “antidiscrimination law regulates the social practices that sustain the rela-
tive social position of [W]hites and [B]lacks, men and women . . . [or] the social practices
that sustain group inequality”).  Colorblindness is analytically similar to the concept of
post-racialism:
[T]wenty-first century ideology that reflects a belief that due to racial progress the
state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-based remedies,
and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing principle of social
action.  According to post-racial logic the move is to effectuate a “retreat from race.”
Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1589, 1594 (2009) (citations omitted); see
also Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 994 (2010)
(“If post-racialism were pressed to its fullest extent, it is unlikely that even statutory impact
cases would survive.”).
114. Professor Richard Primus explains three other ways the Court could approach
this constitutional issue.  First, the general reading of Ricci (and Scalia’s reading) “means
that the actions necessary to remedy a disparate impact violation are per se in conceptual
conflict with the demands of the disparate treatment doctrine (and, implicitly, the demands
of equal protection).”  Primus, supra note 12, at 1344.  If a court applies the general read-
ing, disparate impact would be struck down as violating the Equal Protection Clause.  Id.
Second, under the institutional reading,
[A] municipal employer’s attempt to implement a disparate impact remedy is in con-
ceptual conflict with the prohibition on disparate treatment (and implicitly with the
requirements of equal protection) not because any disparate impact remedy is dis-
criminatory but because public employers, unlike courts, are not authorized to engage
in the race-conscious decision making that disparate impact remedies entail.
Id. (emphasis in original).  The institutional reading only allows courts to enforce dispa-
rate-impact remedies, not public employers; but disparate impact narrowly survives. Id. at
1345.  Third, the visible-victims reading “holds that the problem in New Haven’s case was
not the race-consciousness of the city’s decision per se but the fact that the decision disad-
vantaged determinate and visible innocent third parties—that is, the [W]hite firefighters.”
Id. at 1345.  Under this reading, disparate impact is constitutional as long as implementing
the disparate-impact remedy does not create visible victims.  Id.
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ance reading urges the courts to be judicial minimalists and keep avoiding
the constitutional question.  The constitutional avoidance reading should
be the most obvious reading—even the Ricci Court avoided the constitu-
tional issue.  This reading acknowledges that there is a real tension be-
tween disparate impact and equal protection, but advocates that courts
should keep using and refining the strong-basis standard as a way to
avoid the constitutional issue.
After all, Scalia’s war on disparate impact might just be a warning to
Congress that the Court has the nuclear option of striking disparate im-
pact if Congress amends the strong-basis standard.  Scalia did, of course,
write the unanimous opinion in Lewis that also avoided the constitutional
issue.
The avoidance reading uses a prudential rule of statutory interpretation
called the canon of constitutional avoidance.  The avoidance canon holds
that if a statute is ambiguous and has more than one reasonable interpre-
tation, then courts should choose the interpretation that avoids raising
constitutional questions with the statute when disposing of the case.115
This avoidance principle has a historic pedigree116 as a statutory-default
rule.117  The canon also has enjoyed tremendous support from the Su-
115. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 14 (2007);
1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.13(g) (4th ed. 2007); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions,
85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997).  Under the classical avoidance canon, “as between two
possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by
the other valid, [a court’s] plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.”  Blodgett v.
Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring); see also United States ex rel.
Att’y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909) (“It is elementary when the
constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the statute be reasonably susceptible of two
interpretations, by one . . . it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our
plain duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional
infirmity.”).
116. For instance, in 1787, Justice Iredell stated that an act “should be unconstitu-
tional beyond dispute before it is pronounced such.” 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 24 n.1 (rev. ed. 1937); see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (“The question, whether a law be void for its repugnancy to
the constitution . . . ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful
case.”); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“[T]o
authori[z]e this Court to pronounce any law void [requires] a clear and unequivocal breach
of the constitution.”); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concur-
ring) (finding that because the power of judicial review “is of a delicate and awful nature,
the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case”).
117. See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UN-
CLEAR LEGISLATION 237–39 (2008) (describing the canon of constitutional avoidance as “a
supplemental default rule”).
2011] DISPARATE IMPACT 187
preme Court.118  As Hart and Wechsler’s famous casebook argues, the
avoidance canon is integral to understanding the proper and limited role
of the federal courts in our system of government.119
The Court’s modern articulation of the avoidance canon urges the
Court to be even more deferential to Congress:
[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress. . . . [T]he elementary rule is that
every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a
statute from unconstitutionality.  This approach not only reflects the
prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly con-
fronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound
by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution.120
118. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 241 (2009) (withdrawing from strict adherence
of a previously Court-mandated procedure, determining that to do so would “depart from
the general rule of constitutional avoidance”); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of
judicial restraint, however, that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in ad-
vance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Parker v. Los Angeles Cnty., 338 U.S. 327, 333
(1949) (“The best teaching of this Court’s experience admonishes us not to entertain con-
stitutional questions in advance of the strictest necessity.”); Rescue Army v. Mun. Court of
Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 572 (1947) (“Time and experience have given [the avoidance
cannon] sanction.  They also have verified . . . that the choice was wisely made.”); Spector
Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more
deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we
ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is
unavoidable.”).
119. RICHARD H. FALLON JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 76–80 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that the constitutional
avoidance doctrine is “the most important and controversial”); see ELHAUGE, supra note
117, at 239 (theorizing that the avoidance canon arose and/or serves a number of purposes
in balancing the role of the judiciary with that of the legislature); LISA A. KLOPPENBERG,
PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 1 (2001) (describing the Court’s use of the avoidance canon as
“predicate[d] . . . on the separation of powers principle”); 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra
note 115.
120. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (“[The avoidance canon] is a tool for choosing
between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable
presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitu-
tional doubts.”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (“‘[I]t is a cardinal principle’
of statutory interpretation . . . that when an Act of Congress raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to
its constitutionality, ‘this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’”) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) (alteration in the original); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513
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The Court finds that “where a statute is susceptible [to] two construc-
tions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise
and by the other of which such questions are avoided our duty is to adopt
the latter.”121
The Ricci Court implicitly applied the avoidance canon.  The Court was
presented with at least two ways of interpreting the tension between dis-
parate impact and disparate treatment: they could either interpret Title
VII to include a strong-basis standard (or some other standard) to deal
with the statutory tension, or rule on the constitutionality of disparate
impact.  The avoidance canon demanded that the Court borrow the
strong-basis standard, so the Court would not have to rule on the consti-
tutional issue.122
Critics will argue that the avoidance reading here allowed the Court to
rewrite Title VII in a way that Congress did not intend.123  Critics also
U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (opting for the statutory interpretation that would not “raise serious
constitutional doubts”); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1979)
(adhering to precedent dating as far back as 1804 holding that the Court must first decide
whether the action at issue “would give rise to serious constitutional questions” before
further determinations); Int’l Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961)
(“[T]he restraints against unnecessary constitutional decisions counsel against their deter-
mination” unless the Court concludes it cannot interpret the statute in a way so as to avoid
the constitutional question).  This canon is followed out of respect for Congress, which we
assume legislates in the light of their constitutional limitations.  FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
264 U.S. 298, 305–06 (1924).  The canon is qualified by the proposition that “avoidance of a
difficulty will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion.”  George Moore Ice
Cream Co., Inc. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933).
121. United States ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).
122. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 27 (2005) (explaining that judicial minimalists “seek
to avoid taking stands on the biggest and most contested questions of constitutional law”);
Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term–Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 (1996) (arguing for “decisional minimalism” by the Supreme
Court, meaning “saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome and leaving as much
as possible undecided”).
123. POPKIN, supra note 115 (finding that critics argue that the avoidance cannon
spreads “a mantle of legitimacy over a judge-created law and leaving in place a law that the
legislature may have difficulty removing”); 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 115.  For
more critiques of the canon, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 363 (2d ed. 2006) ) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE STATUTORY IN-
TERPRETATION] (“When the canon is invoked, the best interpretation of the statute is jet-
tisoned in favor of any alternative that is ‘fairly possible,’ a slippery requirement
that . . . provides[s] little barrier to truly implausible attributions of statutory meaning.”);
KLOPPENBERG, supra note 119 (finding that the avoidance cannon is applied inconsis-
tently); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 105 (1997) (arguing that
the avoidance canon may result in interpretations which are different from what Congress
intended, thus courts will likely “[misconstrue] the statute and [make] its construction
uncorrectable”).
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find that when courts invoke the avoidance reading, they often “engage
in sloppy constitutional analysis, in order to avoid responsibility for a de-
cision based on other grounds.”124  According to Professor William Es-
kridge, one of the leading critics of the canon, Judge Henry Friendly,
finds that the canon allows for “stealth judicial activism, which is both
anti-democratic and unhealthy for the judiciary.”125  A corollary of this
criticism is that the avoidance canon is applied unpredictably.126
Despite the criticism, the avoidance canon has obvious benefits that
outweigh the criticisms.  Professor Philip Frickey finds that the “canon
The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions is
therefore to enlarge the already vast reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even
the most extravagant modern interpretations of the Constitution—to create a judge-
made ‘penumbra’ that has much the same prohibitory effect as the judge-
made . . . Constitution itself . . . .
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE  FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285 (1985); William
N. Eskridge Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1066
(1989) (finding that invoking public values to avoid constitutional doubts would be “incon-
sistent with legislative supremacy”); Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCar-
thy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation
in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 400 (2005) (“A fundamental attack is
that the avoidance canon allows a court, on the vague ground that a serious constitutional
question exists, to rewrite statutes without clear limits on the revising role and without a
clear demonstration that the Constitution compels rejecting the most natural interpretation
of the law.”); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch
Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 835 (2001) (finding that separation of powers doctrine
urges courts to abandon the avoidance canon); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doc-
trine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 224 (finding that the nondelegation
doctrine’s goals are ill-served by “a technique that asserts the prerogative to alter a stat-
ute’s conventional meaning and, in so doing, to disturb the apparent lines of compromise
produced by the legislative process”); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Cen-
tury of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100
YALE L.J. 545, 573–75 (1990) (arguing for less constitutional avoidance in immigration law
instead of enforcing constitutional norms through avoidance); John Copeland Nagle, Dela-
ware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1496–98 (1997) (arguing that the
avoidance canon should be narrowed to “the unconstitutionality canon” which “requires a
court to decide the constitutional question while the [avoidance] canon allows a court to
avoid any such decision”); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71,
83 (finding the avoidance canon encourages stealth judicial activism); Vermeule, supra
note 115, at 1946 (finding an inherent tension between the avoidance canon and severabil-
ity doctrine).
124. ESKRIDGE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 123; see also Pub. Citizen v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 481 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The fact that a
particular application of the clear terms of a statute might be unconstitutional does not
provide us with a justification for ignoring the plain meaning of the statute.”).
125. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION,
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 919 (4th ed. 2007) (emphasis in original)
(citing HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 211–12 (1967)).
126. Id. at 920.
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may perform an invaluable normative function in public law.  The canon
provides a means to mediate the borderline between statutory interpreta-
tion and constitutional law, and between the judicial and legislative roles,
where judicial line-drawing is especially difficult, and where under-en-
forced constitutional values are at stake.”127
Professor William Eskridge finds there are three important values that
the avoidance canon preserves.  First, the avoidance canon helps to ascer-
tain legislative intent.  For instance, “[t]he avoidance interpreter assumes
that the legislature would not have wanted to press constitutional limits,”
when enacting the disparate-impact statute.128  Second, the canon gives
effect to under-enforced constitutional norms.129  For instance, because
courts “are loath to strike down immigration statutes,” they give effect to
due process and free speech norms through narrow statutory construc-
tions.130  This practice is evident in Ricci because the Court gave effect to
under-enforced equal protection norms even though it did not technically
rule on the constitutional issue.131  Moreover, because constitutional lan-
guage like “due process” and “equal protection” is vague, and  that courts
are required to elaborate on these doctrines which go beyond anything
127. Frickey, supra note 123, at 402.
128. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra  note 125, at 918 (emphasis in original).
129. Motomura, supra note 123, at 563.
130. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra  note 125, at 918 (citing Hiroshi Motomura, Immigra-
tion Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 572–73 (1990)).
131. Ricci seems to give effect to these equal protection norms because the Court
repeatedly used the equal protection framework while adjudicating the firefighter’s dispa-
rate-treatment claim, suggesting that “whatever distinctions there may be between dispa-
rate treatment and equal protection have little importance to either doctrine’s relationship
to disparate impact law.”  Primus, supra note 12, at 1356.  First, the Court did not say
whether the Ricci plaintiffs suffered an adverse employment action, like being fired, which
is required for Title VII but not the constitution. See Tristin Green, Title VII, the Adverse
Action Requirement, and Ricci v. DeStefano, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 5, 2009, 11:39
PM) www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/02/title_vii_the_a.html.  Second, the
Court skipped over the usual method of disparate-treatment analysis, the McDonnell-
Douglas burden-shifting framework.  Even though the district court in Ricci applied this
framework, the Court avoided this analysis even though every Supreme Court case prior to
Ricci used this framework when analyzing a disparate-treatment claim.  Primus, supra note
12, at 1359; see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 151 (D. Conn. 2006), rev’d 564
U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (employing the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting test
because the plaintiffs had alleged intentional discrimination).  Third, the Court said essen-
tially that the city’s “predominant motive” for throwing the test out was because of race,
which is an equal protection term.  Primus, supra note 12, at 1360–61.  Finally, the Court
borrowed the strong-basis equal protection standard, which for constitutional cases pro-
vides the standard of evidence needed for a government body to institute an affirmative-
action plan.  Id. at 1361.  Additionally, the Court identified no differences between the
equal protection and Title VII strong-basis standards, suggesting that they are practically
the same. Id. at 1361–62.
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that can be gleaned from the text, courts should avoid debatable case-by-
case elaborations when possible.132  This is especially true of constitu-
tional law because Congress cannot reenact a statute that is deemed un-
constitutional.133  Third, the avoidance canon gives effect to the passive
virtues of not unnecessarily striking down democratically enacted stat-
utes.134  Avoidance then, is a way for courts to preserve their institutional
capital and appear legitimate in the eyes of the people.135
Justice Breyer has recently advocated that the avoidance canon is a
pragmatic method of statutory interpretation that creates a workable con-
stitution and helps to secure continued acceptance and credibility of the
federal judiciary.136  For example, in Zadvydas v. Davis,137 Breyer found
the Court interpreted an unclear statute in a way that was not Congress’s
first choice, but it was preferable for the Court to choose the “risk of
ignoring Congress’s purpose over the risk of setting the statute entirely
aside.”138  Breyer finds that Congress would prefer this trade off, favoring
an interpretation of a statute that “ensured its continued validity to an
interpretation that made it vulnerable to invalidation.”139
132. ESKRIDGE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 123, at 361; see also
Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 857
(2005) (“The principle of constitutional avoidance has a long and distinguished pedigree
and is grounded in the recognition that constitutional interpretation and judicial review are
delicate functions.”).
133. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 125, at 918; ESKRIDGE, STATUTORY INTERPRE-
TATION, supra note 123, at 361.
134. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 125; see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 122, 169, 183 (1962) (discussing the value of the avoidance canon as
a passive virtue and the positive implications of the avoidance canon).
135. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 125; but see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRET-
ING THE CONSTITUTION 134 (1987) (arguing that the Court’s legitimacy is not fragile, and
conserving judicial credibility should not be a primary objective in constitutional interpre-
tation).  Indeed, the Court has pushed through political firestorms following  decisions
which alter the political arena, such as Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) “with
its institutional credibility intact.”  Jonathan S. Carter, Passive Virtues Versus Aggressive
Litigants: The Prudence of Avoiding a Constitutional Decision in Snyder v. Phelps, 89 N.C.
L. REV. 326, 343–44 (2010).
136. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 105
(2010); see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989) (“[W]e are
loath to conclude that Congress intended to press ahead into dangerous constitutional
thickets in the absence of firm evidence that it courted those perils.”); POPKIN, supra note
115, at 15 (“Supporters of the canon point to the pragmatic justification—forcing the legis-
lature to revisit legislation which impinges on important values so that the legislature
reaches that result only after careful attention.”).
137. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
138. BREYER, supra note 136, at 104.
139. Id.
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In applying the avoidance canon to the equal protection issue raised by
Ricci, there appears to be a “serious doubt” as to the disparate-impact
statute’s constitutionality, as raised by Scalia’s concurrence in Ricci and
Primus’ general reading of Ricci.140  Although disparate impact does not
require direct intentional discrimination, it does seem to encourage indi-
rect discrimination.141  Because there is a serious doubt as to disparate
impact’s constitutionality, a court needs to “ascertain whether a construc-
tion of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question
may be avoided.”142  One construction of the disparate impact statute
that surely meets this standard is the strong-basis standard.  This is ex-
actly what the Ricci Court did, although the Court did not explicitly raise
the constitutional problem and then try to find an alternative statutory
interpretation to avoid the issue.143  A “fairly possible” and reasonable
interpretation that avoids the equal protection issue is to adopt the
strong-basis interpretation of Title VII and continue using this
standard.144
Although Ricci implicitly avoided the constitutional issue, courts
should explicitly avoid the constitutional issue in future cases if a litigant
makes a wholesale challenge to disparate impact.  Those arguing for
avoidance should try to persuade courts to further interpret the dispa-
rate-impact statute in a way that allows the strong-basis standard to alle-
viate equal protection concerns.
In sum, the avoidance reading does not encourage a blanket rewriting
of the disparate-impact statute.  It only encourages a flexible reading of
the strong-basis standard.  And avoidance is the best strategy for protect-
140. This preliminary factual inquiry proved that there is a risk of constitutional adju-
dication, which is the step zero of a constitutional avoidance analysis.  Anthony Vitarelli,
Comment, Constitutional Avoidance Step Zero, 119 YALE L.J. 837, 837 (2010).
141. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 102 (finding that disparate-impact statutes incen-
tivize employers to enact affirmative action programs so that employers are immune to
class claims of disparate impact).
142. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (emphasis added); see also Ashwander
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (laying out a
series of rules the Court follows when looking at Constitutional questions of law).
143. Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts
Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 194–95 (finding the avoidance canon in play in Ricci even
though the word “avoidance” was not used in the opinion).
144. To avoid the constitutional question here, courts would only have to use this
narrow “fairly possible” formulation of the avoidance canon. ESKRIDGE, STATUTORY IN-
TERPRETATION, supra note 123; see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490,
510–11, (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding the narrow avoidance canon is favorable
because it “acts as a brake against wholesale judicial dismemberment of congressional en-
actments.  It confines the judiciary to its proper role in construing statutes, which is to
interpret them so as to give effect to congressional intention”).
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ing this important piece of civil-rights legislation.145  “[N]o one should
underestimate the Court’s ability” to indefinitely duck the question of
disparate impact’s constitutionality.146  The reason that the Court should
duck is that an opinion that strikes down disparate impact would likely be
the twenty-first century “incarnation of Lochner v. New York,147 in which
the Court overrode democratic judgments in favor of a dubious under-
standing of the Constitution.”148  Sometimes the most important thing
the Court does, then, is “not doing.”149
C. Another Reason to Avoid: The Lewis Court Failed to Raise the
Equal Protection Issue
After writing a concurrence in Ricci arguing that disparate impact is
unconstitutional, Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Lewis that, surpris-
ingly, made it easier for plaintiff’s to bring disparate-impact claims.  This
raises the question: Has Justice Scalia abandoned his concerns with the
constitutionally of disparate impact, or is he waiting for a better case to
come before the Court?  In Lewis, the Court surely avoided the constitu-
tional issue.  Although the constitutionality of disparate impact was not
directly before the Court in Lewis, the constitutionality of disparate im-
pact was surely in the justices’ minds after reading Scalia’s Ricci concur-
145. Moreover, there are some statutes that are so revered that they are treated as
part of our Constitution.  Indeed, America is a republic of statutes, the classic example
being the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because of its broad constitutional reverberations and
extension of equal protection norms. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7, 14 (2010).  Because of
this, Professor William Eskridge Jr. argues that the Court should give the benefit of the
constitutional doubt to a superstatute like the Civil Rights Act, which is “a thoughtful
response to an important social problem adopted after intense public debate and congres-
sional deliberation.  When applying the open-textured provision of the Constitution [like
those protecting equal protection] the Court should consider the deliberated responses of
Congress . . . .” Id. at 435; see id. at 467 (finding that courts should construe ambiguous
statutes in favor of politically marginalized minorities).  The argument is that striking down
the disparate-impact is tantamount to striking down part of our Constitution.  However,
some scholars argue that the disparate-impact prong of Title VII does not deserve height-
ened constitutional deference like the disparate-treatment prong. See Primus, supra note
12, at, 1380 n.177.
146. John P. Elwood, What Were They Thinking: The Supreme Court in Revue, Octo-
ber Term 2008, 12 GREEN BAG 429, 432–33 (2009).
147. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
148. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term–Second Amendment Minimal-
ism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 247 (2008).
149. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS 17 (1967) (dissecting an opinion of Justice Brandeis in a decision on the Child
Labor Tax).
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rence and the briefs.  So was Lewis an act of avoidance even though the
Court did not have the constitutional issue squarely before them?
Party control over the issues that reach the courts is a defining charac-
teristic of our judicial system.  Judges are discouraged from engaging in
“‘issue creation’—that is, raising legal claims and arguments that the par-
ties have overlooked or ignored—on the ground that doing so is antitheti-
cal to an adversarial legal culture that values litigant autonomy and
prohibits agenda setting by judges.”150  Yet issue creation by federal
judges happens frequently,151 and the Supreme Court often adds to the
questions presented as well.152  In 2009, for instance, the Court ordered
re-arguments in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission153 as to
whether the court should strike down a part of a campaign-finance law
limiting corporate funding in elections.154  The Court then overruled pre-
cedent and struck down the law.155
Citizens United illustrates that the Court is willing to engage in issue
creation if it wants to.  The Lewis Court could have just as easily ordered
re-argument as to whether disparate impact violates equal protection.
Professor Amanda Frost argues that courts should be willing to raise is-
sues sua sponte as a way for judges to uphold their constitutional duty to
say what the law is.156  Indeed, Frost argues that:
[T]he Court may need to engage in issue creation to reverse one of
its own precedents.  The parties will often hesitate to challenge a pre-
150. Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 447 (2009).
151. For instance, landmark Supreme Court cases like Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
238 (1976), decided constitutional issues never raised by the parties.
152. Frost, supra note 150; see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992)
(noting that the Court has “on occasion rephrased the question presented . . . or requested
the parties to address an important question of law not raised”).
153. 558 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
154. See Robert Barnes, Justices to Review Campaign Finance Law Constraints,
WASH. POST, June 30, 2009, at A3, available at 2009 WLNR 27045505 (calling the order to
delay the decision and to schedule “a rare September hearing” a “surprise move”).
155. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010).
156. See Frost, supra note 150, at 470 (defending “the occasional use of judicial issue
creation as an essential tool with which the courts can protect the integrity of judicial deci-
sionmaking and the law itself”). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Re-
mained Silent: Why the Court Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 287, 292 (2000) (“[C]ourts exceed[ ] the appropriate judicial role in raising a major
constitutional issue not presented by the parties . . . .”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978) (asserting that the system works
best when the decisionmaker “rests his decision wholly on the proofs and argument actu-
ally presented to him by the parties”).
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cedent directly, preferring to distinguish it from their case, and thus
the Court may be forced to raise the issue on its own motion.157
Moreover, the prohibition on judges from acting as roving commission-
ers or mini-legislators “does not justify a court’s refusal to raise a consti-
tutional question that goes to the heart of a case before it, and which the
court is required to decide.”158
It is seriously unlikely that a public fire department, like in Ricci or
Lewis, is going to argue that the disparate-impact statute is unconstitu-
tional.  It is taboo to argue that civil-rights statutes are unconstitutional.
Indeed, the only serious arguments for the proposition that disparate im-
pact is unconstitutional have come from libertarian organizations, such as
the Pacific Legal Foundation.159  Since barely anyone will argue against
the constitutionality of a civil-rights statute, this increases the necessity of
the Court to address the constitutional issue if needed.  There are no
clear guidelines about when the Court will deviate from its practice of
letting parties frame the legal issues.160
If the Court really thought that the disparate-impact statute was plainly
unconstitutional and that the issue could not be avoided, then the Court
should have raised the issue in Lewis, just like the Court sua sponte
raised the constitutional issue in Citizens United.161  Since disparate im-
pact was read into Title VII in 1971 in the Griggs case, disparate impact
has been assumed to be constitutional.  And in 1976, Washington v. Davis
rejected the idea that the government could be sued under the Equal
Protection Clause for causing a disparate impact, but the Court opined in
dicta that “Congress could create disparate-impact statutes.”162  Al-
though there is no precedent saying disparate impact is constitutional,
this has been the dominant understanding after Davis.  Until very re-
cently it would have been absurd to think that the application of the dis-
parate-impact statute could ever violate equal protection.163  As Justice
157. Frost, supra note 150, at 514.
158. Id. at 486.
159. See, e.g., Brief for Pac. Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 11, Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010) (No. 08-974) (arguing
that the disparate impact provisions of Title VII will only encourage race to continue to be
factor in American’s lives).
160. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 346 (7th ed. 1993); see
also Frost, supra note 150, at 463 (addressing reasons why judges may raise issues sua
sponte).
161. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election. Comm’n, 558 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 876, 888
(2010) (noting that the Court requested that the parties file supplemental briefs on
whether the Court should overrule certain cases).
162. Primus, supra note 12, at 1343; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
163. Primus, supra note 12, at 1343.
196 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:165
Brennan stated, “[t]he more longstanding and widely accepted a practice,
the greater its impact upon constitutional interpretation.”164
Because the Court did not raise the equal protection issue in Lewis,
this demonstrates the Court’s continuing practice of avoiding the consti-
tutional question, as they should.
D. Striking down Disparate Impact Would Cause a Showdown over
Congress’s Authority Under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment
The Equal Protection Clause protects against the denial of equal pro-
tection by state governments.165  Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment grants Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation”
the Equal Protection Clause.166  The unresolved question that the Court
would have to face if they wanted to strike down disparate impact is
whether the scope of Congress’s Section Five power includes the power
to enact the disparate-impact prohibition.
The Section Five question is a threshold issue for deciding the constitu-
tionality of disparate impact.  According to Professor Chemerinsky,
In deciding whether a state can be sued under a federal statute, the
court must decide whether the law is a valid exercise of Congress’s
§5 powers.  If the Court upholds the law as permissible under §5, the
state may be sued, otherwise the litigation cannot go forward against
the state government.167
The Court needs to determine whether Congress lawfully abrogated the
states’ Eleventh Amendment right of sovereign immunity against law-
suits.168  Thus, before getting to the issue of whether Congress was pro-
hibited from enacting the disparate-impact statute under equal protection
because of the statute’s overt concern with race, the Court would have to
answer the Section Five question.
164. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  The Fourteenth Amendment  protections against
violating ones equal protection rights only apply to governmental action, not to private
conduct.  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10–11 (1883); see United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (“Foremost among these limitations is the time-honored principle
that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action.”).
167. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.7
(3d ed. 2006).
168. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9 (1890) (“[A]nd the question is presented
whether a state can be sued in a circuit court of the United States by one of its own citizens
upon the suggestion that the case is one that arises under the constitution or laws of the
United States.”).
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Based on the latest Supreme Court opinions on the Section Five issue,
Congress can enact statutes under its Section Five powers if the claims
Congress allows against state governments receive heightened judicial
scrutiny like race.169  Congress has much broader authority to legislate if
the claim is a type of discrimination that receives heightened scrutiny or
strict scrutiny, like racial or gender discrimination.170  For instance, in Ne-
vada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,171 the Court upheld a
federal statute under a Section Five challenge, concluding that state em-
ployees could sue their employers for violating the family-leave provision
of the Family and Medical Leave Act.172  The Court said Congress was
clearly trying to prevent state gender discrimination in employment,
which triggers heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.173
However, it is not clear whether the Court’s Section Five cases author-
ize Congress to enact the disparate-impact statute.  Clearly, Title VII’s
disparate treatment provision would be allowed under Congress’s Section
Five powers because Congress would be enforcing a remedy against in-
tentional race discrimination, a claim that receives strict scrutiny.  When a
government employer intentionally discriminates, it violates the Equal
Protection Clause and Congress can pass a law to stop that violation.
However, it is constitutional for a government employer to allow dispa-
rate impact discrimination to persist after Washington v. Davis.174  This
indicates that the disparate-impact statute may exceed Congress’s reme-
dial power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, even if disparate
treatment is within Congress’s power.  This question is officially un-
resolved since courts and scholars have remained divided on this issue.175
169. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 167.
170. Id.
171. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
172. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003).
173. Id. at 736.
174. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
175. Primus, supra note 100, at 495 n.4.  Some courts have concluded that Congress
can enact Title VII’s disparate impact prohibition under Section Five, see Okruhlik v. Univ.
of Ark. ex rel. May, 255 F.3d 615, 626–27 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Emp’t Discrimination Litig.,
198 F.3d 1305, 1321–24 (11th Cir. 1999).  However, other courts have disagreed. See Erick-
son v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that Congress may not
use Section Five to enact Title VII’s disparate impact prohibition).  Commentators also
disagree on the subject. Compare Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation,
115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 698 (2001) (concluding that disparate impact liability is an accom-
modation requirement given to Congress by Section Five), Rebecca S. Giltner, Note, Justi-
fying the Disparate Impact Standard Under a Theory of Equal Citizenship, 10 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 427, 460 (2005) (asserting that the disparate impact standard is an important
legal theory that is within Congress’s authority), Claude Platton, Note, Title VII Disparate
Impact Suits Against State Governments After Hibbs and Lane, 55 DUKE L.J. 641, 643
(2005) (arguing that under the logic of the Court’s Section Five precedent, “Title VII’s
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Professor Kenji Yoshino even thinks that “Justice Scalia [in his Ricci con-
currence] hinted that the disparate impact provisions of Title VII might
not find adequate ground in Congress’s [S]ection Five power.”176  This
contentious debate over Congress’s Section Five power is all the more
reason for courts to avoid the constitutional question of whether dispa-
rate impact is unconstitutional.  Answering this question will open a Pan-
dora’s Box of difficult legal issues.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR KEEPING THE STRONG-BASIS STANDARD AND
STICKING TO CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE READING
No legal rule perfectly solves intractable social issues like the proper
boundaries of the antidiscrimination laws.  The Ricci strong-basis stan-
dard is a better policy alternative than completely axing disparate im-
pact.177  This Note finds that the strong-basis standard is the best
available way for a court to deal with situations in which the employer is
facing either disparate treatment or disparate-impact liability, depending
on whether the employer keeps the test.  This is why the Court should
adopt the constitutional avoidance reading.  This reading is a minimalist
one because it advocates for keeping disparate impact and the strong-
basis standard, while letting the lower courts work out how to apply the
standard.178
disparate impact provision is an appropriate legislative response to this country’s long his-
tory of discrimination against women and racial and ethnic minorities, and it applies to
government and private employers alike”), with Nicole E. Grodner, Note, Disparate Im-
pact Legislation and Abrogation of the States’ Sovereign Immunity After Nevada Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Hibbs and Tennessee v. Lane, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1173, 1212–23
(2005) (asserting that it is unlikely that Congress’s Section Five authority applies to dispa-
rate impact cases under Title VII).  For scholarship debating the scope of Congress’s Sec-
tion Five power, see Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term - Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 136–53 (2001);  Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and
Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537 (1998); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal
Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110
YALE L.J. 441 (2000); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112
Yale L.J. 1943 (2003).
176. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 773 (2011).
177. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the
Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2592–93 (2006) (finding that there is “strong evidence that, for
hard statutory questions within the Supreme Court, policy arguments of one or another
sort often play a central role . . .”).
178. Because the law naturally moves to become more efficient, the strong-basis stan-
dard should become a more efficient legal tool as time passes.  George L. Priest, The Com-
mon Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977).
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A. Arguments for Keeping the Strong-Basis Standard
i. The Strong-Basis Standard is More Fair than a Good-Cause
Standard
If a good-cause standard was enacted to overturn Ricci,179 an employer
could hypothetically throw out a valid test multiple times until they
reached their preferred numerical balance.180  This is why the Court in
Ricci sided with the strong-basis standard.  Even proponents of the good-
cause standard concede that if an employer did throw out the test multi-
ple times, this creates an inference of intentional discrimination.181  But
even allowing an employer one free pass to throw out a test with just a
statistical disparity or “good cause” and some evidence of problems with
the test would give employers too much room to discard tests.182
The strong-basis standard also seems to be more fair than the good-
cause standard because it guards against the soft coercion of the dispa-
rate-impact doctrine. Some commentators argue that disparate impact in-
centivizes employers to reach a racially balanced workforce to mitigate
the threat of disparate-impact liability.183  This is called soft coercion be-
cause disparate impact does not force employers to adopt quotas per se,
but if employers do reach a proportional balance there is less threat of
liability.  One way to guard against disparate-impact liability is for em-
ployers to adopt affirmative action plans.184  However, the strong-basis
standard guards against the soft coercion of disparate impact since em-
179. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (implying that the strong-basis standard does not have “staying power,” and
that Congress should enact a less burdensome standard);  Harris & West-Faulcon, supra
note 7 (urging Congress to overturn Ricci in its entirety).
180. Professor Hart argues that even a good-cause standard would not be helpful for
those who disagree with Ricci because the central assumption of the case—that when em-
ployers seek to avoid tests that unfairly impact minority workers they are engaging in dis-
crimination against White workers—would still be left intact after legislation. See Melissa
Hart, From Wards Cove to Ricci: Struggling Against the “Built-in Headwinds” of a Skepti-
cal Court, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 278-79 (2011).
181. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–49, Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct.
2658 (2009) (Nos. 07–1428 & 08–328).
182. See Lynda L. Arakawa & Michele Park Sonen, Note, Caught in the Backdraft:
The Implications of Ricci v. DeStefano on Voluntary Compliance and Title VII, 32 U. HAW.
L. REV. 463, 483 (2010) for a proposal that advocates for a standard similar to good cause.
See also Erica E. Hood, Note, The Quintessential Employer’s Dilemma: Combating Title
VII Litigation by Meeting the Elusive Strong Basis in Evidence Standard, 45 VAL. U. L.
REV. 111, 154–55 (2010) (advocating an amendment to Title VII that would allow “em-
ployers to implement good-faith affirmative action practices” when discarding disparate
test results).
183. Heriot, supra note 90.
184. Id.
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ployers can no longer throw out tests without substantial evidence of de-
fects with the test.
In addition, the unfairness of the good-cause standard might make it
constitutionally suspect.185  A close reading of Ricci implies that the
strong-basis standard is the minimum standard necessary under the Con-
stitution.186  Of course, a hard question remains as to whether there
would be discriminatory intent against White firefighters if a city throws
out a test because too few minorities pass.187  But if Congress enacted the
185. See, e.g,. Petitioners Brief on the Merits at 49, Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __,
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328) (arguing that “at a bare minimum [under the
Constitution], a governmental actor must have a ‘strong basis in evidence’ that goes well
beyond a prima facie case before it could ever engage in intentional racially disparate
treatment based on a purported fear of disparate-impact claims”).
186. This de facto constitutional ruling in Ricci is similar to the de facto constitutional
ruling in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).  The Zadvydas Court avoided the serious
constitutional question of whether indefinite detention of aliens is permissible, and read
into a detention statute that aliens can only be detained for a reasonable amount of time,
but not indefinitely. Id. at 689. Zadvydas and Ricci are similar because both cases explic-
itly avoided the constitutional question while implicitly deciding the constitutional ques-
tion.  In Zadvydas, the Court signaled that they would strike down a statute that
authorized the indefinite detention of aliens. Id.  Likewise, Ricci signaled that only a
strong-basis standard satisfies equal protection, and that the Court would strike down a
good-cause standard if enacted.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2691
(2009).
187. One way to test whether there was discriminatory intent is the following: “A
court applying the discriminatory intent standard should ask: suppose the adverse effects
of the challenged government decision fell on [W]hites instead of [B]lacks, or on men
instead of women.  Would the decision have been different?  If the answer is yes, then the
decision was made with discriminatory intent.”  David A. Straus, Discriminatory Intent and
the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 957 (1989).  Under this “reversing-the-
groups” test then, a city might fail because it is not likely that they would discard the tests
if Whites did poorly.
Yet, many scholars question whether the Ricci firefighters were actually intentionally
discriminated against at all. See Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn
Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 223 (2010)
(questioning whether “‘an employer’s attention to its practices’ racially disparate impact is
itself evidence of its racially discriminatory intent”); see also Harris & West-Faulcon, supra
note 7, at 118–20 (“What is striking . . . is that the Ricci plaintiffs projected—and later the
majority of the Court accepted—the framing of the case as one in which [W]hites were
racial victims, even though no minorities—indeed no one—got the jobs at issue.”).
It seems strange to view the [C]ity of New Haven as canceling the test because it
wanted to disadvantage the [W]hite firefighters, although New Haven certainly knew
that that would be the result.  A better reading of the facts . . . is that New Haven
acted to avoid disparate impact liability despite the “adverse effects upon an identifi-
able group” of [W]hites.
Sullivan, supra note 40, at 416–17 (emphasis in original); Leland Ware, Ricci v. DeStefano,
Smoke, Fire and Racial Resentment, 8 RUTGERS J. L.& PUB. POL’Y 1, 20-26 (2011); Michael
J. Zimmer, Ricci’s “Color-Blind” Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of Unin-
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good-cause standard, the Court seems ready to strike it down under strict
scrutiny review because there is no compelling interest that could be nar-
rowly tailored.188
tended Consequences?, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1258–59 (2010) (asserting that the Court
in Ricci empathized with the plaintiffs, which caused them to find discrimination in order
to transform disparate treatment law).
However, in this so-called post-racial era, the definition of discrimination may be chang-
ing.  In a recent study, scholars found that there is an emerging belief that Whites view
racism as a zero-sum game, such that decreases in perceived bias against Blacks over the
past six decades is associated with increases in perceived bias against Whites (a relationship
not observed by Blacks). See Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism
as a Zero-Sum Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 215, 215 (2011),
available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/mnorton/norton%20sommers.pdf.  Further, these
scholars found that Whites now come to view anti-White bias as a bigger societal problem
than anti-Black bias. Id. Thus, Whites now increasingly believe that they are being dis-
criminated against. See Victoria C. Plaut, Law and the Zero-Sum Game of Discrimination:
Commentary on Norton and Sommers (2011), 6 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 219, 220-21 (2011)
(noting that this “zero-sum finding suggests that the landmark cases that are upsetting the
structure of antidiscrimination law may in fact reflect a broader sentiment in society. To
the extent that this is the case, future efforts geared at antidiscrimination of historically
disadvantaged racial minorities must be prepared to grapple with a fundamental shift in
the presumptions of what constitutes discrimination.”).
188. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 18–21, Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct.
2658 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328) (arguing that the city did not provide adequate justifica-
tion to support its race-based action).
It [the city] did not claim it was attempting to remedy past official discrimination, and
its stated fear of Title VII litigation or liability based merely on unintentional numeri-
cal disparity cannot supply the requisite compelling interest, particularly when [the
city] had no reason to think that the test inflicted any impermissible discrimination?
. . . .  [T]he remedy selected by the city cancelling the promotions across the board was
not narrowly tailored to achieve any compelling interest.
Id. at 19; see also Kristina Campbell, Note, Will “Equal” Again Mean Equal?: Understand-
ing Ricci v. DeStefano, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 385, 410–15  (2010) (arguing that strict
scrutiny should be applied to disparate impact, and that when applied, disparate impact is
not narrowly tailored to stop intentional discrimination). But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16–21 at 1520 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that strict judicial
scrutiny should be reserved for specific government acts”).  “Those acts that, given their
history, context, source, and effect, seem most likely not only to perpetuate subordination
but also to reflect a tradition of hostility toward an historically subjugated group, or a
pattern of blindness or indifference to the interests of that group.” Id. See also John Hart
Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 735
(1974) (“When the group that controls the decision making process classifies so as to ad-
vantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being unusually suspicious, and,
consequently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lacking.”).
Most importantly, there is no existing compelling governmental interest for keeping dis-
parate impact. The only existing compelling interest that could be used to justify disparate
impact would be the interest of remedying past unlawful discrimination. See, e.g., Freeman
v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) (addressing racial imbalance occurring in schools).  But
disparate impact does not require any finding of past discrimination for disparate impact to
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The primary reason that the Court would likely strike down a good-
cause standard is that the Court draws the line between “race-conscious
measures that visibly burden specific innocent parties [visible victims, like
the firefighters in Ricci] and race-conscious measures intended to im-
prove the position of disadvantaged groups but whose costs are more dif-
be used, unlike public-employer affirmative action programs.  Thus, there does not seem to
be any existing compelling interest that could save disparate impact.  Professor Eang Ngov
argues that removing barriers to employment for minorities should be adopted as a com-
pelling interest for keeping disparate impact.  Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title
VII’s Disparate Impact Provision and the Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compel-
ling Interest, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 80–88 (2010); see also Jennifer S. Hendricks, Contin-
gent Equal Protection: Reaching for Equality After Ricci and PICS, 16 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 397, 451 (2010) (“The Court should explicitly recognize that both state and federal gov-
ernments are empowered to strive for the elimination of structural inequalities.”).  How-
ever, removing barriers to employment is not likely to be recognized as a new compelling
governmental interest because it does not stand on the same normative foundation of rem-
edying past discrimination against minorities.  In other words, remedying past identified
discrimination is a much more compelling reason for allowing government to racially dis-
criminate than just removing barriers.
Additionally, some circuits have recognized a compelling interest in a diverse police de-
partment. See, e.g., Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that a diverse police force can increase police effectiveness in protecting a city by earning
the community’s trust); Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y. v. City of New York, 310
F.3d 43, 52 (2d Cir. 2002) (recognizing the need for law enforcement to be able to accom-
plish its mission in an effective manner); Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 931-32
(4th Cir. 1981) (finding that “the attainment of racial diversity in the top ranks of the
police department was a legitimate interest of the city”).  However, unlike police depart-
ments, it seems that the racial diversity of a fire department is irrelevant to its core ability
to protect the public from fires and other emergencies. Michael Selmi, Understanding Dis-
crimination in a “Post-Racial” World, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 847–48 (2011) (explaining
that fire fighters already have the community’s trust).  Further, the compelling interest in
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding that racial diversity in higher educa-
tion is a “compelling state interest” justifying the use of racial preferences to ensure that
there is a “critical mass” of minority students) does not easily transfer over to fire fighters.
See Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding Grutter’s “com-
pelling interest in the educational benefits of diversity” is only for educational institutions,
not fire departments).  There is also no compelling interest to increase the amount of mi-
nority fire fighters so that they can be role models. Cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (plurality opinion) (finding that the role model theory may actually
sanction discriminatory hiring practices).
Based on all of this, a successful compelling interest defense of disparate impact is un-
likely.  Primus, supra note 12, at 1363 (“[C]ompelling interest defenses are always long-
shots.”). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006) (finding in an
empirical study that “30 percent of all applications of strict scrutiny . . . result in the chal-
lenged law being upheld”).
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fuse.”189  Two examples illustrate the point that state actions that do not
create visible victims are constitutional.
First, consider the Texas ten percent plan.  Under this plan, the state
admits to the University of Texas all Texas high school students that grad-
uated in the top ten percent of their class.190  This plan has been upheld
by one circuit court even though it was designed with the motive of in-
creasing diversity.191
Second, consider using race to increase diversity in secondary schools.
In Parents Involved in Community Schools192, Justice Kennedy wrote that
school district could increase diversity by race-neutral means by choosing
how to draw the district lines or where to place the school even if the
school could not specifically use a person’s race to achieve the same
goal.193  Because the good-cause standard would more easily create visi-
ble victims than the strong-basis standard, it is constitutionally suspect.194
189. Primus, supra note 12, at 1369.  This is also evidence of  a zero-sum understand-
ing of equality, that steps taken to benefit minorities necessarily mean that the decision
maker is prejudiced against nonminorities.  Norton, supra note 187, at 258; see also Patricia
J. Williams, When Prejudice Is So Malleable, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2011, 12:10 PM),
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/22/is-anti-white-bias-a-problem/when-prejudice-
is-so-malleable (finding that “[z]ero-sum formulations of prejudice tend to emerge in lean
economic times, fueling cultural or historical rivalries of all sorts”).
190. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2011).
191. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 263 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying the
standard set forth in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)); see supra note 188.  Racial
conservatives strongly disagree with decisions like this. See, e.g. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict
Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 289, 292 (2001) (“[T]here is something wrong, indeed, unconstitutional, with
a legislative motive to increase the percentage of one racial group in a state university at
the expense of another.”); Kenneth L. Marcus, The War between Disparate Impact and
Equal Protection, 2008-09 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53, 73 (2009) (“Under Ricci and Parents
Involved, the Ten Percent Plan should trigger strict scrutiny to the extent that Texas’s racial
motivations predominated in the institution of the plan.”).  Generally though, the majority
of people agree with the Texas plan, including many conservatives such as former President
Bush who created the plan. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 361 (2009)
(pointing out that President Bush advanced the plan to “assure a diverse university
population”).
192. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
193. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Primus, supra
note 12, at 1369.
194. Another way to think about this idea is to ask whether the government’s action
would create racial harm, i.e., singling out individuals on the basis of their race for some
type of adverse treatment.  Adams, supra note 113, at 862.  One lesson from Ricci is that
the good-cause standard would more likely create racial harm because individuals would
more likely to be singled out for adverse treatment because of their race.  Thus, while
government can still seek to open up access to opportunity and increase integration, it
must do with without imposing racial harm. Id. at 837, 862–63.
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Similar to the visible-victims reading is the antibalkanization principle,
which also can be seen in Parents Involved and Ricci. In both of these
cases, according to Professor Reva Siegal, “Justice Kennedy affirm[ed]
race-conscious facially neutral laws that promote equal opportunity (such
as disparate impact claims . . . ) so long as the enforcement of such laws
does not make race salient in ways that affront dignity and threaten divi-
siveness.”195  Siegal also emphasizes that appearances matter here, and
when racial considerations play a “visible” role when applicants are com-
peting for promotion, this undermines the confidence of job applicants
about whether they had a fair opportunity to compete.196  Antibalkaniza-
tion suggests then that the strong-basis standard is more appropriate.  If
employers follow this standard, they are less likely to use disparate im-
pact in a way that affronts the dignity of any of the applicants or threat-
ens racial divisiveness in the community.197  Indeed, this
antibalkanization principle provides race moderates reasons to uphold
disparate-impact law in general, but the principle also provides reasons to
limit disparate-impact law, such as by using the strong-basis standard.198
ii. Ricci Makes Disparate Treatment Easier To Prove and Narrows
Disparate Impact
Because the Court found disparate treatment so easily for the White
firefighters in Ricci, a broader understanding of the scope of intentional
discrimination may be emerging.  Professor Michael Zimmer finds that
Ricci modifies the elements of a traditional disparate-treatment claim to
make it easier for all plaintiffs to prove that an employer had discrimina-
tory intent.199  Similarly, Professor Kerri Stone finds that disparate treat-
195. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground
of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1278 (2011).
196. Id. at 1334–35.
197. Id. at 1347–48.
198. Id. at 1365.
199. See Zimmer, supra note 187, 1259 (explaining that violating the “color-blind”
standard often generates disparate treatment liability).  In fact, disparate-treatment liabil-
ity is created “if the plaintiff proves that (1) the defendant knew the racial consequences of
its decision, (2) it then made that decision in light of that knowledge, thus making the
decision ‘because of race,’ and (3) the plaintiff suffered the effect of an adverse employ-
ment action.” Id.  Zimmer further indicates that “the ease with which [the Ricci Court]
found disparate treatment may have the ironic effect of opening new avenues for civil
rights advocates to more easily and therefore more successfully bring disparate treatment
actions.” Id. at 1307.; see also Henry L. Chambers Jr., The Wild West of Supreme Court
Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV. 577, 588 (2010) (“Ricci could
be thought to imply that race consciousness coupled with an adverse decision often proves
disparate treatment.”); Michael Subit, A Plaintiffs’ Employment Lawyer’s Perspective on
Ricci v. DeStefano, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 199 (2010) (finding that the “major-
ity took a very expansive view of disparate treatment” on account of race in Ricci).  Inter-
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ment is now easier to prove after Ricci because the Court ushered in the
“transferred intent” theory of Title VII: “one who is adversely affected by
a decision that is ‘race-conscious,’ or made with race in mind, may prove
intentional disparate treatment under Title VII, even if her race was not
considered at all or was consciously disregarded in the decision-making
process.”200 The theory is discernable from Ricci because the Court found
that the refusal to use the test results amounted to discrimination against
all plaintiffs who wanted to use the test, including the one Hispanic plain-
tiff whose race did not motivate New Haven’s adverse employment deci-
sion at all.201
These theories are welcome developments because the disparate-im-
pact theory was a mistake to begin with since disparate impact choked off
the evolution of disparate-treatment theory—“a broader definition of in-
tent could have served the same purpose as disparate impact.”202  Indeed,
the Ricci decision improves employment-discrimination law by expanding
the scope of intentional discrimination.  This will help combat the grow-
ing evidence that workplace discrimination is structural and
unconscious.203
The strong-basis standard also narrows the scope of disparate-impact
discrimination because it appears to create a new defense for employers
against a disparate-impact claim.  According to Professors Joseph Seiner
and Benjamin Gutman, “an employer that bases an employment decision
on workplace test results would have a defense to a claim of disparate
impact if it can show: (1) a strong basis in evidence that (2) it would have
estingly, if this interpretation were to be accepted, this would reduce many of the recent
pleading problems under the antidiscrimination statutes.  Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly
Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1645 n.158 (2011).
200. Kerri Lynn Stone, Ricci Glitch? The Unexpected Appearance of Transferred In-
tent in Title VII, 55 LOY. L. REV. 751, 753 (2009) (emphasis in original); see also Kerri Lynn
Stone, Ricci Glitch, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 6, 2009, 6:46 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2009/07/ricci-glitch.html (questioning the ease in which a disparate treatment
plaintiff may be able to prove discriminatory intent following the decision in Ricci).
201. Stone, supra note 200, at 752.
202. Selmi, supra note 33, at 706, 782.
203. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Criti-
cal Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893
(2009) (indicating that discrimination in the workplace is often unintended, invisible, and
difficult to prove); Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate:
Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849 (2007) (explaining that bias is displayed
subtly in workplace decision making); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behav-
ioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995) (questioning the hypothesis that discrimination in the workplace is intentional and
suggesting that most “biased employment decisions” are unintentional).
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been liable for disparate treatment if it had discarded the test results.”204
Essentially, this means disparate treatment now trumps disparate impact.
This is appropriate given that intentional discrimination is a worse of-
fense than unintentional discrimination.205
iii. The Strong-Basis Standard Fits into a Theory of Judicial
Minimalism
The strong-basis standard is also desirable because it fits into the the-
ory of judicial minimalism in which judges should favor narrow rulings
over broad ones and “attempt to reach incompletely theorized agree-
ments in which the most fundamental questions are left undecided.”206
In Ricci, the Court purposefully ruled on the narrow statutory question in
creating the strong-basis standard; and the ruling was incompletely theo-
rized because the fundamental question of disparate impact’s constitu-
tionality was avoided.  Similarly, in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District Number One v. Holder (NAMUDNO),207 the Court “embraced a
manifestly implausible statutory interpretation to avoid the constitutional
question” concerning the Voting Rights Act.208 NAMUDNO and Ricci
show that the Roberts Court will attempt to avoid constitutional issues of
civil rights statutes if possible.209  These minimalist interpretations of civil
204. Seiner & Gutman, supra note 85, at, 2181, 2205; see discussion supra Part II.C.
But see Briscoe v. City of New Haven, No. 10-1975-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16834, at *21
n.13 (2d Cir. Aug. 15, 2011) (rejecting this analysis because there is no good-faith defense
for disparate-impact liability).
205. Cf Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 7, at 111 (“Ricci resolves this conflict by
installing hierarchy that favors disparate treatment over disparate impact claims.”).
206. SUNSTEIN, supra note 122, at 28–29 (emphasis omitted).
207. 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
208. Hansen, supra note 143, at 182; see Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2506 (2009) (avoiding the question of whether Section
Five of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional by creating a new definition of political
subdivision).
209. Many argue that Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. __, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010) (striking down  a provision in a campaign finance law limiting corporate
funding of political broadcasts as violating the First Amendment) shows that the Roberts
Court is not minimalist because in the case they skipped past a statutory solution, over-
ruled precedent, and ruled on the constitutional issue. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court’s
Blow to Democracy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2010, at A30 (adducing that the Supreme Court
overreached and used a case that involved a narrow issue to expand upon Citizens United
and strike down the campaign finance  law provision).  But the story is more complicated.
The central issue in Citizens United was whether a statutory solution existed so that the
Court could avoid the constitutional issue. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 896
(2010).  The majority rejected the proposed statutory solution whereas the dissent did not.
Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 889, 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The majority spent many pages
explaining why they could not avoid the constitutional issue. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct at 888-96.
And Roberts specifically distinguished the avoidance done in NAMUDNO, and why he
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rights statutes are beneficial because it shows deference to Congress and
judicial restraint for such important legislation.
iv. The Strong-Basis Standard Fits Under the Standard
Constitutional Borrowing Framework
One irony of the strong-basis standard is that the Court avoided the
equal protection issue by borrowing the strong-basis standard from equal
protection jurisprudence.  Yet this sort of borrowing is ubiquitous in con-
stitutional law.  Constitutional borrowing is the process of a court draw-
ing from one domain of constitutional law in order to interpret or bolster
another domain.210  Analyzing the strong-basis standard through the con-
stitutional borrowing framework shows that the strong-basis standard
could be a lasting solution to the conflict between equal protection and
Title VII.  The most common method of borrowing is called transplanta-
tion, which is what the Court did in Ricci.211
Professors Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai encourage analysis of the
transplantation version of constitutional borrowing through the criteria of
fit and completeness.212  There are four factors for evaluating how well
different bodies of constitutional law fit together: (1) synergy and nov-
elty, (2) persuasiveness, (3) practical yield, and (4) whether background
conditions affect the combination of ideas.213  Based on these factors, it
appears there is a tight fit between the constitutional and the statutory
felt compelled to decide the constitutional issues in Citizens United. Id. 558 U.S. at __, 130
S. Ct. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Hasen, supra note 143.  By contrast, the dissent
thought that a plausible statutory solution mandated the Court to avoid the constitutional
issue finding that “[e]ach of the [avoidance] arguments . . . is surely at least as strong as the
statutory argument the Court accepted in last year’s Voting Rights Act case
[NAMUDNO].” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at__, 130 S. Ct. at 938 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).  This indicates that the Court is headed in a modest conservative direction.  Adam
Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at A1, availa-
ble at 2010 WLNR 14791293.  However, the Court is still committed to avoiding constitu-
tional issues and minimalism if they believe there is a valid basis for deciding the claim.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
210. Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV.
459, 463 (2010).
211. Id. at 472 (defining transplantation as the importing of “legal ideas, in whole or
piecemeal, from one context to another”).  In deciding to borrow from equal protection,
Justice Kennedy noted that the tension between disparate impact and disparate treatment
is similar to the tension in constitutional affirmative action cases between the principle that
there should be no governmental discrimination and a government’s need to use race-
conscious measures to remedy past discrimination.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S.
Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009).
212. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 210, at 472 n.30, 495 (“Questions of fit arise with great-
est urgency when one engages in an original act of transplantation. . . .”).
213. Id.
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strong-basis standards.  First, there is synergy between the standards be-
cause they are both allowing a race-conscious remedy to benefit minori-
ties when there is strong evidence of either past or disparate-impact
discrimination.  Moreover, discrimination in the Title VII and equal pro-
tection contexts are nearly coextensive.  Second, there are persuasive rea-
sons for appropriating the strong-basis standard; the same interests are at
work in both the equal protection and Title VII settings.  Public opinion
also supports the Ricci plaintiffs.214  Third, the practical yield of the bor-
rowing creates a way to solve the conflict between the two strands of Title
VII.  Fourth, there does not appear to be any background conditions that
would hinder the success of the borrowing.
In addition, problems of completeness are not prevalent with the
strong-basis standard.  The standard is not borrowing from one different
understanding of equality to another, such as when gay marriage propo-
nents compare the denial of marriage based on sexual orientation to the
denial of marriage based on race.215  That the Court only partially bor-
rowed the equal protection strong-basis standard is a better option than
wholesale borrowing because this “preserves maneuverability in current
and future deliberations.”216  Because the Title VII strong-basis standard
is incomplete, lower courts have more discretion to develop the standard
to resolve new conflicts.
B. Arguments Against the Strong-Basis Standard
i. Lack of Guidance for Lower Courts
One of the strongest criticisms of the standard is that it provides no
guidance for the lower courts.217  The Court explained that a prima facie
case of disparate impact—a sheer numerical disparity between Whites
214. See QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLLING INST., U.S. VOTERS DISAGREE 3–1 WITH
SOTOMAYOR ON KEY CASE, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. NATIONAL POLL FINDS; MOST SAY ABOL-
ISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (2009), available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1295.xml?Re-
leaseID=1307 (reporting that seventy percent of Americans believed that the City of New
Haven should be required to use the results of a promotion test even if that result was that
no Black firefighters were promoted); Emily Swanson, US: National Survey (CNN 6/26-
28), POLLSTER (June 29, 2009, 5:09 PM) http://www.pollster.com/blogs/us_national_survey_
cnn_62628.php?nr=1 (reporting that sixty-five percent of the public think that the White
firefighters were victims of discrimination and should get the promotions based on the test
results).
215. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 210, at 506.  This is a more complicated type of borrow-
ing.  Id. (finding this type of borrowing has been resisted by the African-American
community).
216. Id. at 505.
217. Kathy DeAngelo, Note, Title VII’s Conflicting “Twin Pillars” in Ricci v. DeStef-
ano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361, 371 (2009).
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and minorities—does not satisfy the strong-basis standard.218  For liabil-
ity, there has to be a prima facie case and strong evidence that the test is
not job related, or a less-discriminatory alternative test that the employer
refuses to accept.  Satisfying the strong-basis standard requires less evi-
dence than the amount needed for an employer to prove a disparate-
impact case against itself.  Indeed, the most guidance on the standard
comes from the Ricci facts themselves: the amount of evidence the city
had in Ricci of lack of job relatedness for the test does not satisfy the
standard.  Besides that, courts are left to their own intuition.
Yet, judges usually are quite skilled at applying ambiguous standards,
so the dire predictions of havoc from an ambiguous standard are unwar-
ranted.  Courts will figure out what amount of evidence is considered
“strong” through the common-law process of applying factors to weigh
various types of evidence.219
Professor Kenneth Marcus argues that the strong-basis standard is inef-
fective because it is likely that the standard was incorrectly applied in the
first place.220  Marcus finds that “a strong case can be made that the city
would have been liable under existing disparate-impact law to the extent
that it had failed adequately to consider alternative procedures that
would have generated less racially disparate results.”221  However, there
was no evidence the city was actually presented with a less discriminatory
alternative test.
The first application of the Title VII strong-basis standard surfaced in a
follow-up case to Ricci called Briscoe v. City of New Haven.222  In this
case, Michael Briscoe—the Black firefighter who scored the highest on
the oral portion of the test in Ricci, but was ineligible for promotion be-
cause his written score was low—filed a disparate-impact suit against the
218. Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009).
219. Marcus, supra note 191, at 76 (listing factors that may be used to assess whether
an employer has a strong basis, including: “the credibility of witnesses, the availability of
evidence, the sympathetic qualities of the likely plaintiffs, or its own unsympathetic quali-
ties”).  One court has already started this process of deciphering what constitutes a strong
basis in evidence. See United States v. Brennan, No. 08-5171-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
9455, at *133 (2d Cir. May 5, 2011) (“[A] strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact
liability is an objectively reasonable basis to fear such liability.  It is evaluated at the time
an employer takes a race-conscious action.  It relies on real evidence, not just subjective
fear or speculation.”).  The court in Brennan extended Ricci and held “that the strong-
basis-in-evidence standard of Ricci applies not only to the question of disparate-impact
liability, but also to the further question of whether the employer’s race- or gender-con-
scious action is necessary to remedy that disparate impact.” See id. at *136–37.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 77.
222. No. 3:09-cv-1642, 2010 WL 2794231 (D. Conn. July 12, 2010).
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city.223  He claims that he would have been promoted if the test weighting
formula had been modified to give more weight to the oral component of
the test, instead of the 60-percent-writing/40-percent-oral formula that
the city used.224  The Ricci Court anticipated a lawsuit like this, which is
why the court inserted this passage at the end of the opinion:
Our holding today clarifies how Title VII applies to resolve compet-
ing expectations under the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact
provisions.  If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a dispa-
rate-impact suit [like from Briscoe], then in light of our holding to-
day it should be clear that the City would avoid disparate-impact
liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not certi-
fied the results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment
liability.225
Based on this passage that seemingly created a strong-basis-standard de-
fense to disparate-impact suits, the district court held that Ricci “squarely
foreclosed” Briscoe’s claims and dismissed his suit because there was no
evidence of less discriminatory alternatives (like a different test weighting
formula) that served the city’s needs.226  The district court appeared to
correctly apply this strong-basis standard defense to disparate-impact
suits by dismissing Briscoe’s disparate-impact suit.227
However, the Second Circuit reversed and held that Ricci did not fore-
close Briscoe’s claim of disparate-impact discrimination.228  The court
read the passage just quoted from Ricci as having “no actual logical rela-
tionship to the holding”229 in which the City of New Haven was ordered
by the Ricci Court to reinstate the test results.  The Second Circuit found
that a ruling for the city would affect a substantial change in Title VII
disparate-impact litigation because it would create an affirmative defense
to disparate-impact claims, and that it was unreasonable to believe that
the Supreme Court intended to create this defense with a “single sen-
tence of dicta” targeted only at the parties affected by the test in Ricci.230
But given that the Ricci Court expressly stated that it was resolving the
223. Briscoe v. City of New Haven, No. 3:09-cv-1642, 2010 WL 2794231, at *1–*3 (D.
Conn. July 12, 2010).
224. Id.
225. Ricci v. Destefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009).
226. Briscoe, No, 3:09-cv-1642, at *6.
227. Id.
228. Briscoe v. City of New Haven, No. 10-1975-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16834, at
*2 (2d Cir. Aug. 15, 2011).
229. Id. at *15.
230. Id. at *23.
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competing expectations under both the disparate-treatment and dispa-
rate-impact provisions,231 this interpretation may be further challenged.
Overall, the strong-basis standard, although imperfect, is workable.
The disparate-treatment prong of the strong-basis standard, like that used
in Ricci itself, seems to be effective since lower courts are working out
how to apply it.232  Nevertheless, the Second Circuit in Briscoe did show
that the disparate-impact prong of the strong-basis standard can be inter-
preted multiple ways, which may eventually necessitate further review by
the Supreme Court.233
ii. The Strong-Basis Standard Will Hinder Employers’ Efforts to
Diversify Their Workforces
Professors Cheryl Harris and Kimberly West-Faulcon contend that
“Ricci reflects a doctrinal move towards converting efforts to rectify ra-
cial inequality into White racial injury.”234  These professors are correct
in that an employer’s previous efforts to rectify inequality—by discarding
tests because of mere statistical imbalances—are no longer allowed.  This
means that employers that do not care about increasing diversity will
have little incentive to discard valid tests to remedy disparate impacts.
Since disparate treatment carries much higher damages than disparate
impact,235 a rational employer might just wait to be sued for disparate
impact before taking steps to remedy unequal results for fear of dispa-
231. Ricci v. Destefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009).
232. United States v. Brennan, No. 08-5171-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9455 (2d Cir.
May 5, 2011).
233. The reason this ruling seems paradoxical is because the Ricci Court ordered the
city to use the test.  But the Second Circuit interpreted Ricci to allow employees who did
not pass the test to sue the city for using this very same test even though the city was forced
against their will to use the test (and eventually pay a substantial settlement to the Ricci
plaintiffs).  In arguing that Ricci left no room for Briscoe’s lawsuit, Victor A. Bolden, cor-
poration counsel for the City of New Haven, stated:
‘An examination is either valid or invalid, . . . .  Either it is a legitimate tool for promo-
tion to a position or it is not a legitimate tool to determine who should be promoted.
It, however, cannot be both.  The Supreme Court ordered the city to promote consis-
tent with the examination’s results.  These court-sanctioned promotions are lawful and
the exam results used in making them must be considered legitimate as well.’
NY Court Reinstates Lawsuit by Black Conn. Fireman, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 2011, on-
line.wsj.com/article/APdbb6a223c5a441c78ee3701eec83ffdd.html.
234. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 7, at 81.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006) (establishing that compensatory and punitive
damages can be granted “against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional dis-
crimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate
impact)”).
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rate-treatment suits by White employees.236  However, employers can
purposely design tests and other practices with the intent of helping mi-
norities succeed.  Accordingly, Ricci may make it harder to increase di-
versity by old means, but employers still have plenty of options to
increase diversity.237
236. Similarly, fearing liability from the strong-basis standard, municipalities may “re-
quire even higher percentage disparities or relative pass rate differences before making a
voluntary prophylactic change [to an employment practice], if they attempt to do so at all.”
Scot Rives, Comment, Multiracial Work: Handing Over the Discretionary Judicial Tool of
Multiracialism, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1322 (2011).
237. One of the traditional means of increasing diversity is for a private employer to
create a voluntary affirmative action plan under Title VII.  The standards for applying
these private affirmative action plans were laid out decades ago in United Steel Workers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) and Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
Under these cases, the standard for private affirmative action plans was much less rigid
than for public affirmative action plans, which must comply with strict scrutiny.  However,
one scholar finds that the Ricci Court likely “wrote the majority opinion in such a way as to
erode Weber and Johnson by stealth to make it easier to later expressly limit the circum-
stances under which Title VII permits voluntary [private] affirmative action plans.” Sachin
S. Pandya, Detecting the Stealth Erosion of Precedent: Affirmative Action After Ricci, 31
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 285, 330 (2010); Juan Williams, Affirmative Action’s Untimely
Obituary, WASH. POST, July 26, 2009, at B1 (arguing that Ricci blows apart the past Title
VII framework for voluntary affirmative action plans); see also George Rutherglen, Ricci
v. DeStefano: Affirmative Action and the Lessons of Adversity, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 83,
113 n.62 (2009) (noting that Weber was “conspicuously not cited in any of the opinions in
Ricci.”).  Similarly, Professor Corrada finds that the Ricci decision “strongly suggests the
introduction of a new legal standard for Title VII affirmative action, forged in the context
of the already-existing standard for affirmative action under the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.”  Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci’s Dicta: Signaling A New Standard
for Affirmative Action Under Title VII?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 241, 258 (2011).  The
new standard for private Title VII affirmative action plans then would be the strong-basis
standard. See Roger Clegg, Dousing the Fires of Racial Discrimination, JOHN WILLIAM
POPE CENTER FOR HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY (July 28, 2009), www.popecenter.org/clar-
ion_call/article.html?id=2209 (arguing for the use of the strong-basis standard for all af-
firmative action plans). Thus, if this analysis is correct, voluntary affirmative action plans
under Title VII would still be permissible after Ricci, but private affirmative action would
be more circumscribed than under Weber and Johnson.
If anything is clear, the scope of what is considered to be a valid Title VII affirmative
action plan has not expanded because of Ricci.  For instance, one court held that the “man-
ifest imbalance” and “no unnecessary trammeling” analysis under Weber and Johnson only
extends to the narrow situation where an employer has undertaken a forward-looking af-
firmative action plan designed to benefit all members of a racial or gender group. See
United States v. Brennan, No. 08-5171-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9455, at *7 (2d Cir. May
5, 2011 2011) (finding that when an employer “provides individualized race- or gender-
conscious benefits as a remedy for previous disparate impact, the employer must satisfy the
requirements of Ricci, not Johnson and Weber, in order to avoid disparate-treatment
liability”).
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As the majority opinion explained, a lower standard for discarding tests
would create a “de facto quota system.”238  Vocal critics of disparate im-
pact will further contend that disparate impact, even with a strong-basis
standard, creates an incentive for employers to reach quotas, and will ar-
gue that disparate impact should be abolished altogether.  However, the
strong-basis standard creates less incentive for employers to create quotas
because employers must have substantial evidence that the test is not job-
related.  Without this evidence, the employer cannot throw out a test
solely based on statistical disparity.  This means that an employer cannot
create de facto quotas.  Indeed, the strong-basis standard actually incen-
tivizes employers to design a test that will not have an adverse impact
because employers now know that they have more hurdles to jump
through if they want to discard a test.239  Given the importance of having
a job for a person’s self-identity,240 and the role that integrated work-
places play in our diverse democratic society,241 employers should design
tests that do not unfairly exclude minority groups.
iii. An Employer’s Incorrect Focus on Liability-Avoidance
Professor Marcus argues that the strong-basis standard makes employ-
ers more concerned about being held liable for the ex post disparate im-
pact of the tests than the ex ante belief that the tests were actually
discriminatory.242  The best response to this argument is that Title VII has
always promoted voluntary compliance as a liability avoidance measure.
Further, it is unproblematic if an employer takes into account the credi-
bility of the witnesses and the availability of the evidence in assessing
whether there is strong evidence to throw out a test.  Taking account of
this evidence does not automatically mean that the employer is uncon-
cerned with discriminating against Whites; the employer is merely search-
ing for evidence of a defective test.  If this evidence exists, and the
employer throws the test out based on the evidence, this should not be a
Title VII violation.
238. Ricci v. DeStefano, 564 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2675(2009).
239. Darrell VanDeusen, VanDeusen on Ricci v. DeStefano and its Aftermath, 2009
EMERGING ISSUES 4031, at 10 (advising employers to “vet tests completely and thoroughly
before administering it, and after administering, vet the test completely before making any
decision with respect to the results”).
240. See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1881, 1886–92 (2000)
(finding that a job can transform a person’s identity, build her community, and provide the
basis for her equal citizenship).
241. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 4 (2003) (finding that the workplace is, “generally
speaking, . . . more integrated than most places where adults spend time,” which makes the
workplace “extraordinarily important in a diverse democratic society”).
242. Marcus, supra note 191, at 75.
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Hence, the strong-basis standard may not be in conceptual tension with
the Constitution’s ban on discriminatory treatment.  If an employer has
substantial evidence that a test is not job-related, this should be a nondis-
criminatory and constitutional reason to discard the test.  As Ricci makes
clear, an employer cannot discard a test solely because they think too
many Whites passed.  But when an employer has actual evidence of a bad
test, and if the employer is genuinely discarding the test based on this
evidence, then the employer is unlikely to harbor a discriminatory intent
towards Whites.  The strong-basis standard’s requirement that the em-
ployer have evidence of a bad test actually decreases the chance that an
employer will act with unconstitutional discriminatory intent in comply-
ing with disparate impact.
iv. Likely Impermanence of the Standard
If a conservative Court strikes down disparate impact or substantially
narrows it, the strong-basis standard would be eliminated.  Conversely, a
more liberal Court could strike the strong-basis standard down and insti-
tute a more lenient good-faith standard.  Thus, according to Professor
Marcus, “Ricci’s strong-basis standard would no better survive the ruling
of a sympathetic Court than it would an unsympathetic one.”243
However, the chances of the Court completely striking down disparate
impact are minimal, and liberal courts still must follow conservative pre-
cedent.  Recall that the majority in Ricci could have said that Title VII
does not answer the statutory issue (which, arguably, it does not), skipped
right to the constitutional question, and struck down the disparate-impact
statute.  But they did not.  Instead they applied the strong-basis standard,
as a moderate solution.  Moreover, because the strong-basis equal protec-
tion standard is a long-lasting constitutional precedent, and the strong-
basis Title VII standard is based on the constitutional strong-basis stan-
dard, their fates are tied together.244
V. CONCLUSION
As a practical manner, a holding that the disparate-impact statute vio-
lates the Constitution would call into question a number of other federal
laws that have disparate-impact standards.245  For instance, the disparate-
243. Id. at 78.
244. See, e.g., United States v. City of New York., 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 257 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (“The analytical framework of a workplace equal protection claim parallels that of a
discrimination claim under Title VII. . . .”).
245. Primus, supra note 100, at 496 n.15. See generally Barry Goldstein & Patrick O.
Patterson, Ricci v. DeStefano: Does It Herald an “Evil Day,” or Does It Lack “Staying
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impact standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act,246 Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act,247  the Voting Rights Act,248 the Fair Hous-
ing Act,249 and analogous state laws250 would all be put into jeopardy.
This strongly suggests that courts should not strike down the Title VII
disparate-impact statute because that logic would release a flood of litiga-
tion challenging these other important statutes.
To be sure, disparate impact is a narrower doctrine now than it was
before Ricci.  But the strong-basis standard that Ricci created is a positive
development, ensuring that employers have strong evidence that the test
is not job-related before the test can be discarded.  This standard helps
guarantee that employers are not going to racially balance their
workforces by discarding tests when the numbers do not come out right.
Further, the strong-basis standard is the best standard for mediating the
dispute between disparate impact and disparate treatment.
Ricci also does not provide a cause to worry that the disparate-impact
theory has been completely weakened.  Some commentators predicted
that the case would bring about a doomsday situation, especially if Ricci
stood for the principle that preventing disadvantage to White firefighters
is more important than addressing barriers to promotion for racial minor-
Power”?, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 705, 786–94 (2010) (discussing the laws that would be
impacted).
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1), (b)(3)(A) (2006) (providing for claim for an unjusti-
fied disparate impact on disabled persons); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53
(2003) (“Both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
ADA.”).
247. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) (forbidding adverse employment actions “be-
cause of such individual’s age”); see also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S.
84, 94 (2008) (finding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act provides for dispa-
rate impact claims based on age); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (find-
ing that the Age Discrimination and Employment Act allows recovery for disparate impact
cases).
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)–(b) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination at the polls); see
also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (emphasizing that all that is needed to
establish a disparate impact violation is proof of discriminatory results); Sw. Voter Regis-
tration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“To establish a
[disparate-impact] violation, plaintiffs need only demonstrate ‘a causal connection between
the challenged voting practice and [a] prohibited discriminatory result.’”).
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in the rental or sale of
housing).  The Fair Housing Act has been interpreted to allow disparate-impact claims
where an unjustified policy disproportionately affects a person based on a protected class
concerning housing. See, e.g., Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir.
2007) (listing three factors to consider when assessing a disparate-impact claim).
250. Barry Goldstein & Patrick O. Patterson, Ricci v. DeStefano: Does It Herald an
“Evil Day,” or Does It Lack “Staying Power”?, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 705, 792–93 (2010).
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ities.251  However, the Ricci decision has had a surprisingly limited impact
so far in the lower courts.252
Accordingly, courts should explicitly avoid the constitutional question
of the equal protection doctrine conflicting with disparate impact.253  No
constitutional battle over disparate impact should ever be waged.  In-
stead, courts should further refine the strong-basis standard as a way to
avoid the constitutional issue.254  To do its part, Congress should update
disparate impact in light of Ricci (by clarifying the strong-basis standard)
and Lewis (by clarifying Title VII’s statute of limitations require-
ments),255 or take the bold leap and completely overhaul Title VII.256
251. See Victoria C. Plaut, A Broader Societal Shift, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2011, 12:11
PM), www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/22/is-anti-white-bias-a-problem/a-broader-
societal-shift.
252. Bernard J. Pazanowski, Impact of Ricci Decision Seems Limited so far, Employ-
ment Law Attorneys Opine, 221 DAILY LAB. REP. C-1 (2010) (finding that Ricci has had a
relatively little impact since it was handed down; it is limited to its facts, and it has not
opened up the floodgates of litigation); see also Nancy L. Zisk, Failing the Test: How Ricci
v. DeStefano Failed to Clarify Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Law, 34 HAM-
LINE L. REV. 27, 50 (2011) (finding that lower courts have been reluctant to adopt the Ricci
rule).
Additionally, some commentators are arguing that the strong-basis standard should be
limited to the unique facts of the case because the firefighters had a justified expectation of
being promoted from the test.  Goldstein & Patterson, supra note 250, at 786-94 (asserting
that the standard should be interpreted narrowly, because of the impact it may have on
other laws). But see Sullivan, supra note 187, at 206 (“[T]he majority seems to have been
seeking a broader rule applicable to all disparate impact scenarios.”).  Plaintiffs and de-
fense lawyers also disagree about the impact of Ricci. Compare Subit, supra note 199, at
211 (acknowledging that although the majority took “an expansive view of disparate treat-
ment, the practical result of the decision will be greater racial inequality of employment
opportunity, not less”), with Barbara Jean D’Acquila, A Management Employment Law-
yer’s Perspective on Ricci v. DeStefano, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB & EMP. L. 213, 225 (2010) (high-
lighting the challenge facing employers because the case adds “new and significant
complexity and uncertainty to discrimination laws”).  This debate probably will not make
too much of a difference because few plaintiffs ever win disparate-impact suits, except
well-funded litigants such as the U.S. Department of Justice.  Susan D. Carle, A Social
Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257 (2011).
253. One court has already explicitly avoided the constitutional issue. See United
States v. Brennan, No. 08-5171-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9455, at *119-122 (2d Cir. May 5,
2011).
254. Indeed, there never will be complete peace between disparate impact and dispa-
rate treatment/equal protection claims because employers inevitably must act on the basis
of race. See Stanley Fish, Because of Race: Ricci v. DeStefano, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2009,
10:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/because-of-race-ricci-v-destef-
ano/.
255. The Supreme Court, 2009 Term, Leading Cases, Federal Statutes and Regulations,
124 HARV. L. REV. 340, 349–50 (2010).
256. One familiar criticism about having two separate causes of action for disparate
treatment and disparate impact is that they are extremely confusing, and hard for courts
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What is clear about disparate impact after Ricci and Lewis is that the
theory still plays a vital role in forcing employers to create fair employ-
ment tests for all applicants.257  What is equally clear is that disparate
impact should never be used as an excuse for zero-sum racial politics.258
and practitioners to navigate.  Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Dis-
parate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 96
(2006).  As a solution to this problem, Professor Joseph Seiner has recommended that Con-
gress or the courts should collapse disparate impact and disparate treatment claims to-
gether so that all employment discrimination claims are brought under the same cause of
action. Id. at 130.  Instead of two different causes of action, the plaintiff could show that an
employment practice “is adversely affecting him individually or as part of a larger group
based on a protected characteristic.” Id.  The principle benefit of this approach is that it
reduces confusion and makes employment-discrimination litigation more efficient. Id. at
127.  Canada has adopted this approach after facing similar problems with two separate
theories. Id.
Further, combining the analysis of disparate treatment and impact would focus discrimi-
nation claims on intent. Id. at 127.  This standard would satisfy critics of disparate impact
who find that the theory was a mistake to begin with since the development of the dispa-
rate-impact theory choked off the evolution of disparate-treatment theory.  Selmi, supra
note 33, at 782.  Professor Michael Selmi explains:
The creation of the disparate impact theory also has contributed to a stiflingly limited
view of intentional discrimination . . . .  By itself, a broader judicial definition of intent
would not have led to less inequality, but it may have opened our eyes to the persis-
tence of discrimination in a way that the disparate impact theory could not.
Id.  More importantly, a focus on intent would appease Justice Scalia and others who find
the central problem with disparate impact is that it allows unintentional discrimination
without a good-faith defense.
257. See Carle, supra note 252, at 300 (characterizing disparate impact as “America’s
flagship social movement for racial justice” and arguing that disparate impact should be
saved); cf. Charles M. Blow, Let’s Rescue the Race Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at
A19, available at 2010 WLNR 23157274 (arguing that the African-American community is
doing better than in years past but they still need remedial policies like disparate impact).
258. See Rutherglen, supra note 237, at 85 (arguing that Ricci stands for the principle
of “hostility to zero-sum racial politics—justifying affirmative action for some groups at the
expense of others without any showing of collective benefit to the community as a whole”).

